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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America,
Local Union No. 1082

OPINION AND AWARD

and
The Babcock and Wilcox Company

In dispute is grievance No. 5726.
A hearing was held on June 29, 1984 in Beaver Falls,
Pennsylvania at which time representatives of the above named
parties appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

its summation verbally.

The Union gave

The Company filed a post-hearing brief,

Grievance No. 5726 reads:
I, G. Fanno, Clock No. 8931, a Stamper on the
28" Bar Mill, grieve under Section 13, our
departmental overtime agreement dated November
15j 1984, our incumbency overtime agreement
dated August 13, 1956 and any other pertinent
sections of our basic labor agreement that can
be used by the Union in the settlement of this
grievance. On the first turn, Saturday, January 16, 1982, R. Fray was scheduled as a Stamper.
The Company moved him to fill the job of Gantry
Crane Operator (Fray on overtime). The Stamper
job was filled by A. Pallerino. Pallerino was
paid at overtime rate on the job of Stamper.
Again, if overtime is to be paid on a job it
must be offered to the incumbents of each particular job. I was scheduled on the job of
Stamper on the 7 to 3 shift. This overtime
assignment was not proper. I request all wages
due me because of the Company's actions (eight
hours at overtime rate).
Prior to the start of the first shift on January 16, 1982
of the 28" Bar Mill Operation, J. Tondo, the scheduled Furnace
Operator, reported off.

The Company made several "move up"

-2re-assignments among the remaining new members.

Pritchard was

re-assigned from Gantry Crane Operator to Charge, Fray from
Stamper to Gantry Crane Operator, and Pallerino from Test Stamper to Stamper.

The vacancy that remained in the "bottom Test

Stamper job was filled by assigning Johnson from the labor pool.
The Union claims that the re-assignment of Pallerino to
Stamper was improper; that instead the grievant, Guy Fanno should
have been called in from home for that assignment.
Essentially the dispute turns on whether the Stamper position, under the foregoing circumstances present on January 16,
1982, should have been filled in accordance with an agreement on
"Day to Day Vacancies" (Joint Exhibit 4), or pursuant to the
agreement "Filling Turn Vacancies - Steel Mill Units."
Exhibit 5).

(Joint

The Company relies on the former and the Union on

the latter.
The relevant differences between the foregoing agreements
are that the provisions relied on by the Union in Joint Exhibit
5 are applicable to filling vacancies "when it becomes necessary
to pay overtime..."; and the provisions of Joint Exhibit 4 relied
upon by the Company apply to the filling of vacancies "without
the payment of overtime0.."
The pertinent parts of Joint Exhibit 4 read:
Procedure for Filling Turn Vacancies on a Day
to Day Basis:
A. Policy in Individual Departments:
5. 28" Bar Mill - Move up within crew fill in from Labor Pool on bottom
jobs. Test Stamper can move to Stamper job only. Cannot cross turns.

-3B. Attempt to fill all vacancies without
the payment of overtime. This applies
to all schedules.
C. Fill in from Labor Pool (with straight
time employee).
The pertinent parts of Joint Exhibit 5 read:
Co When it becomes necessary to pay overtime, we must handle it as follows:
b. Have the Employee working the subsequent turn called to report for work
four (4) hours ahead of his regular
schedule.
The Issue therefore narrows to whether the vacancy in
question was filled "when it became necessary to pay overtime"
or "without the payment of overtime."

The Union argues that be-

cause the 28" Bar Mill crew was working on a sixth scheduled day,
and Pallerino also was working a sixth day the work was performed on an overtime basis and hence that part of Joint Exhibit 5
relating to "when it becomes necessary to pay overtime" is controlling.

There is no dispute that the grievant is "the em-

ployee working the subsequent turn" under Section C b of Joint
Exhibit 5.
As I interpret it the Company's position is that a sixth
scheduled day does not constitute the "need to pay overtime"
within the meaning of Joint Exhibit 5.

Its view is in the in-

stant case Pallerino was scheduled as part of the crew, albeit
on a sixth day at overtime, and was available to be assigned to
the Stamper job without the payment of the additional overtime
which would have been incurred had the grievant been called in
earlier than his regularly scheduled "subsequent turn."

Also,

-4as Johnson was already scheduled for a sixth day in the labor
pool, he was available to fill in on the crew without additional overtime.

The Company also asserts that the only other ex-

ception to the Day to Day procedures of Joint Exhibit 4 are when
vacancies take place on paid holidays, pursuant to the Company's
memorandum of May 29, 1967 to "All Steel Mill Supervisors."

It

concludes that a sixth work day under the instant circumstances
is not a contractual exception to the Day to Day Vacancies procedures of Joint Exhibit 4.
I find the two critical agreements (Joint Exhibits 4 and 5)
to be ambiguous, with neither fully conclusive.

It can be

reasonably argued, as does the Union, that because the operation
was on a sixth day at overtime pay and because the Stamper vacancy was filled by an employee also scheduled for a sixth day
at overtime pay, the provisions of Paragraph C of Joint Exhibit
5 ("when it becomes necessary to pay overtime") are applicable,
and under subparagraph b thereof, the grievant should have been
called in.

On the other hand, to call in the grievant would have

required the payment to him of overtime to fill the vacancy when
that particular overtime could have been avoided by the "move up"
procedure and by assigning to the "bottom vacancy" an employee
from the labor pool who was scheduled to work anyway.

Paragraph

A can reasonably be interpreted to mean that an employee should
be assigned to the Stamper job without paying overtime to fill
that vacancy. In this case, because Pallerino and Johnson were
already working that day, their "move up" assignments in and to
the 28" Bar Mill crew made unnecessary the use of overtime for
the purpose of filling the vacancies in the crew.

-5-

Joint Exhibit 4 and the express example of A.5 appear to
track the facts of the instant case.
4 supports what the Company did.

In that regard, Joint Exhibi

As the example for the 28" Bar

Mill states the Company "mov(ed) up within crew - fill(ed) in
from Labor Pool at bottom jobs.

Test Stamper...move to Stamper

job..." However it should be noted that Paragraph C, relating to
filling vacancies "without the payment of overtime" calls for a
"fill in from (the) Labor Pool (with straight time employee)"
(emphasis added).

That the Labor Pool fill in is to be with a

"straight time employee" could be interpreted to foreclose the use
of any Pool employee on a 6th or scheduled overtime day, and that
the entire process of Joint Exhibit 4 under Paragraphs A, B, and
C relate and are confined to regularly scheduled days or in other
words to the regular work week.
Confronted with ambiguities, the Arbitrator looks to past
practice for clarification.

Here the past practice has not been

extensive enough or clear enough to determine precedent or mutual
intent.

Nor do I find the Award of Arbitrator Mullin to be in

point.
Under these circumstances, the record is left inconclusive
and hence unpersuasive one way or the other.

The burden in this

type of arbitration case is on the Union to prove its case clearly
and convincingly.

An inconclusive or unpersuasive record fails to

meet that burden, and accordingly the grievance must be denied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named

-6parties, makes the following AWARD:
Grievance No. 5726 is denied

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 15, 1984
STATE OF New York ),ss
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is may Award.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Office and Professional Employees
Union, Local 281

OPINION
and
AWARD

and
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the contract
(Article XIX) by not recalling Agnes
Hickel to the position of Accounts
Payable Clerk? If so what shall the
remedy be?
A hearing was held in Utica, New York, October 14, 1983
at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
tor's Oath was waived.

The Arbitra-

Both sides filed post-hearing briefs.

Instead of allowing Ms. Hickel, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant" to be recalled from layoff to the position of
Accounts Payable Clerk, the Company recalled to that job, Joyce
Bartlett, a less senior employee0
The Company recalled Bartlett because she had previously
held the job of Accounts Payable Clerk.

It denied the grievant

the recall because she had never held the job.
The instant dispute between the parties is narrow and sharp.
The Company claims that the right of recall is limited to a job
once held.

The Union asserts that recall rights are the same as

bumping rights and cites in support of its position Section (c)(6)
(second paragraph) of Article XIX which reads:

-2-

It is understood that all cases of recall
shall be handled in reverse procedure as
layoffs.
Over the years of the collective bargaining relationship,
the parties expressly negotiated enlarged and more liberal layoff and bumping rights for exercise at the time an active employee
is noticed for layoff.

During that period of time, the afore-

said provision of Section (c)(6) remained unchanged.
It is conceded that if the grievant had been in a layoff
situation she could have bumped into the Accounts Payable Clerk
job, and indeed because of her greater seniority could have
bump .ed Bartlett with respect to that job if Bartlett was then
actively employed as the incumbent in that position.

The Union

argues therefore, that under the contract language which directs
recall to be "handled in reverse procedure as layoffs'1 the grievant had the same seniority right to claim the Accounts Payable
Clerk job on recall as she would have had if she had been subject
to layoff.
The Company interprets the aforesaid contract
differently.

language

It asserts that because it remained unchanged over

the years, in the face of significant changes in layoff and
bumping rights, recall rights remained fixed as original negotiated (when, undisputedly it accorded a right of recall only to
a previously held job).

Only layoff and bumping rights were

expanded, and therefore recall rights were not and should not
now be substantively construed to track those concedely enlarged
layoff rights.

-3In short, the Company claims that through negotiations,
the parties agreed on greater employee rights in layoff and
bumping situations

than for recall.

The Company points out that had there been an intention
to expand recall rights to include the right of recall to jobs
not previously held the language of Section (c)(6) should have
been specifically enlarged accordingly.
The Union responds that the language of Section (c)(6)
made any such change unnecessary; that the language is clearly
"open ended" to accomodate the improved layoff and bumping rights;
that the Union interpreted Section (c)(6) in that "self-enlarging1
way and consciously saw no need to change its language to obtain
expanded recall rights
corresponding
.

to expanded layoff rights;

and that the Company should have known that the Union relied on
that interpretation.
I conclude that the second paragraph of Section (c)(6) of
Article XIX is ambiguous.

Logically and reasonably it can be

interpreted in support of either the Union's or Company's
position.

It is logical to conclude that unchanged contract

language does not possess inherent "self enlarging" capabilities,
but rather is confined to its original meaning and interpretation.
Also the phrase "reverse procedure" is common to contracts in
these circumstances, and generally means that "the last laid off
is the first recalled" as a matter of reverse seniority procedure,
but is not determinative of to which job(s) a recall right may
attach.

-4Conversely, the full phrase is "reverse procedure as layoffs
(emphasis added).

Emphasis on the latter words, may logically

lead to the conclusion that the recall right, in claiming an
available job, is the same as if the employee seeking the job was
doing so because of layoff and pursuant to his bumping rights.
Also, it is reasonable to interpret the critical contract
language as a "favored nation provision" which automatically
increases recall rights in direct relation to increased layoff
and bumping rights.

And it is further reasonable for the Union

to assert that both sides should have known that in view of the
language tying and defining cases of recall to a "reverse procedure
as lay-offs."
In view of this ambiguity it is impossible for this
Arbitrator to determine if layoff and recall rights are different
or synonymous.
Under that circumstance, the Arbitrator looks to past
practice as evidence of what the parties intended and to clarify
or reconcile the prima facie ambiguity.

Here, it is undisputed

that no employee has been recalled from layoff to a job that he
or she had not at some previous time occupied or performed.

If

this information is construed as past practice, the ambiguity is
resolved in the Company's favor.

If this stipulated

information

is inadequate as a past practice, the case record is then left
ambiguously

inconclusive and the Union would not have met its

burden of proving its case clearly and convincingly.
Hence, either way, in the face of the ambiguousness of the

-5-

critical contract langue, the Union's grievance fails.

The issue

remains therefore, a matter for collective bargaining rather than
arbitration.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the contract
(Article XIX) by not recalling Agnes
Hickel to the position of Accounts Payable
Clerk.

DATED: February 20, 1984
STATE OF New York)Q Q *
COUNTY OF New York)bfa''

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 144, S.E.I.U.
AWARD
and
Clearview and Shore View Nursing
Homes and Sea Crest Health Care
Center

Under the collective bargaining agreement between the
above named Union and the above named Nursing Homes and Center,
said Homes and Center are required to make certain regular payroll percentage contributions to the Local 144 Funds„

Also, as

a result of collective bargaining between the Union and the
Homes and Center, certain contractual agreements were reached
regarding eligibility for a so-called "307o Forgiveness" of some
of the contrbituion obligations; for disposition of a so-called
"balloon payment" of monies due the Funds and for the handling
of the labor costs of the so-called Feerick Award.
Considering the foregoing, the above named parties are
in dispute over the total amount that said Homes and Center
owe the Local 144 Funds, including the amount of the interest
on said indebtedness and the calculation of and/or credits of
payments towards that interest.

There is also disagreement,

in part, on the applicable contribution rates to the Funds.
Under the arbitration provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement the Undersigned was selected as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide those disputes.

-2-

Several hearings were held at which time representatives
of the parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Homes and

Center and the Union filed post-hearing briefs.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, makes the following AWARD:

Clearview Nursing Home, Shore View Nursing Home and Sea Crest Health Care Center
jointly owe the Local 144 Funds as of the
date of this Award the total sum of ONE
MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS AND
NO CENTS
($1,300,000) .
Said Homes and Center are directed to pay
said total indebtedness to the Funds forthwith. Provided said Homes and Center have
been current in making current payments,
the payment of said $1,300,000 shall be in
full resolution and liquidation of all indebtedness, including interest, owed said
Funds by said Homes and Center as of the
date of this Award.
With respect to the reimbursement formula
and procedures of the State of New York,
said indebtedness and its payment pursuant
to the foregoing shall relate to the 1979
base year.
The State of New York has recognized that
the labor costs attendant to contributions
to the Local 144 Funds are reimbursable as
part of the Medicaid reimbursement rates.On

-3-

condition that the reimbursement process
for said Homes and Center will apply to
an increase, if any, in any of the contribution rates to the Funds, I direct that
for the balance of the terms of the present
collective bargaining agreements (which expire on March 31, 1984) the contribution rates
of the Homes and Center to the Funds shall be
the same as in the Industry Master Agreement.

DATED: March 5, 1984
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) ' "

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

ER I C J. S C H M E RTZ

P. C.
HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
HEMPSTEAO, NEW YORK 11550
(516) 5 6 O - S 8 5 4

June 18, 1984

Irwin Bluestein, Esq.
Vladeck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard, P.C.
1501 Broadway
New York, New York 10036
Re: Arbitration between Local 144, SEIU and
Clearview Nursing Home, Shore View
Nursing Home and Sea Crest Health Care Center
Dear Mr. Bluestein:
This is in reply to your letter of June 8, 1984
regarding the above matter.
I have repled to Mr. Presant's letter of May 31.
A copy of my reply is enclosed.

ric J/. 'Schmertz
EJS:bp
Encl.

VLADECIC,WALDMAN, ELIAS 8 ENCELHAR.D, P.C.
COUNSELLORS

I 5 O I BROADWAY
STEPHEN C. VLADECK

AT LAW

NEW YORK, N. Y. l o o s e

(I92O-I979)

A R E A C O D E 212

JUDITH P. VLADECK
SEYMOUR

354-633O

M. WALDMAN

SYLVAN H. ELIAS
SHELDON ENGELHARD
I R W I N BLUESTEIN
ROBERT A. CANTORE
JUDITH P. B R O A C H
PAUL R. W A L D M A N
DANIEL ENGELSTEIN
J O S E P H J. GARCIA
PATRICIA MCCONNELL

June 8, 1984

A N N E C. VLADECK

ROBERT B. STULBERG
S A R A H E. S I S K I N D
ALAN M. BROWN
JAMES ROSENTHAL
KENNETH

C.MORGAN

KAREN HONEYCUTT
JOSEPH L. PALLER JR.»
WENDY

R. B R O W N

" ADMITTED CA & PA BAR

only

Eric J. Schmertz, Esq.
Hofstra School of Law
Hempstead, New York 11550
Re:

Arbitration between Local 144, SEIU and
Clearview Nursing Home, Shore View
Nursing Home and Sea Crest Health Care Center

Dear Mr. Schmertz:
We have received by ordinary mail a copy of a letter hand
delivered to you on May 31, 1984 from Howard B. Presant,
Esq., the attorney for the employers in the above matter.
We think it inappropriate on Mr. Presant's part to have
enclosed in his letter a copy of Local 144's motion to
vacate your award in this matter. We also think inappropriate
his request for confirmation from you of his recollection of
discussions during the course of the arbitration relative to
the rendition of a single pecuniary award and "any other
additional facts which you believe would be helpful to the
parties".
We are advised by Robert Cantore of this office, who
represented Local 144 in the arbitration before you, that no
discussions with regard to a single pecuniary award were
had during the course of the hearings and that he specifically
requested, orally and in writing, that each of the separate
issues submitted for hearing and determination be separately
addressed.

Eric J. Schmertz, Esq.
June 8, 1984

The factual question aside, we think it would be
inappropriate for you to respond to Mr. Presant's letter,
since you have previously refused to clarify your award
notwithstanding motions made by the Union and the employers
for such clarification.
Moreover, as we are sure you are aware, the policy
considerations behind the substantial body of case law
protecting an arbitrator from testifying under compulsion in
a proceeding to confirm or vacate his award suggest that an
arbitrator should not voluntarily testify or otherwise
provide one of the litigants in such a proceeding with
supporting evidence.
In the event that you respond to Mr. Presant's request
notwithstanding the views expressed in this letter, we trust
that you will provide us with a copy of any such response.
Very_jtruly yours,

:wih Bluestein
IB/bg
-\
CC: Howard B. Presant, Esq.
^~-~.—

E R I C J. SCH M E R T Z

P. C.
HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL. OF LAW
HEMPSTEAD, NEW YORK 11550
(516) 56O-5S54

June 5, 1984

Howard B. Presant, Esq.
Stein Simpson & Rosen
1370 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10019
Re: Local 144 with Clearview Nursing Homes, et al.
Dear Mr. Presant:
This is in
connection with
to a portion of
Court to vacate

reply to your letter of May 31, 1984 in
my award in the above matter and in response
a motion made by Local 144 in District
that award.

In the second paragraph of your letter you state:
"It is my recollection that at several of the
hearings you advised the parties and their attorneys
that you would render a single pecuniary award
and that no objection was raised by Local 144
or their attorneys at any time during the course
of the arbitration."
The foregoing statement is correct. During the course
of the hearings and in my authorized discussions with
representatives of the parties I said that I would render
an award which would determine the amount of monies owed
by the Homes to the Local 144 Funds. The series of questions
posed to me during the hearings were, in my opinion, merely
components of the single fundamental question and issue,
namely the amount of monies owed by the Homes to the Funds.
I did not view those questions as precise issues which
had to be answered individually. Rather, I viewed those
questions, which I helped frame at the hearings, as guideposts
to the single basic issue and question, namely the amounts
owed by the Homes to the Funds.

ERIC J. S C H M E R T Z

Howard B. Presant, Esq.

- 2 -

June 5, 1984

Therefore, my decision which confined itself to answering
the fundamental issue of the amounts of monies due and
owing, was not only consistent with the issue in dispute,
but was consistent with what I told the parties would
be the form of my decision.
Very truly yours,

Eric
EJS:bp

Schmertz

S T E I N S I M P S O N 5< R O S E N
LAW
I37O A V E N U E

OFFICES
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JOSEPH

5, R O S E N

B R I D G E P L A Z A SOUTH

F O R T LEE, N. J. O 7 O 2 4
2 O I - SS5-O7O4
201- 592 - I 9 O O

May 31, 198*
BY HAND

Eric 3. Schmertz, Esq.
Dean
Hofstra School of Law
Hempstead, New York 11550
Re:

Local 144 with Clearview Nursing Home, et al.

Dear Dean Schmertz:
In March of this year you rendered an award in an arbitration which
resolved several long-standing disputes between the above parties. A motion has
now been brought in District Court by Local 144 seeking to vacate your award. I
have sent to you under separate cover a copy of the motion papers which were
served upon me as the attorney for the Nursing Homes. You will note that the
format (a single dollar amount) of your award has been questioned.
It is my recollection that at several of the hearings you advised the
parties and their attorneys that you would render a single pecuniary award and that
no objection was raised by Local 144 or their attorneys at any time during the
course of the arbitration.
I would most appreciate your confirming this to me and any other
additional facts which you believe would be helpful to the parties.
Sincerely yours,

Howard B. Presant
HBP/kh
enclosure

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Du Art Film Laboratories

The dispute involves the suspension, the involuntary transfer to the day shift and the subsequent discharge of Mr. Rafael
Salinas.
A hearing was held on March 19, 1984 at which time Mr.
Salinas and representatives of the above named Union and Company
appeared.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

At the outset of the hearing, Mr. Salinas stated that he
did not want his disputes with the Company decided in arbitration;
that he had filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission; that he wanted the disputes determined solely by the
EEOC and the courts; that he would not participate in the arbitration and did not want the Union to proceed in arbitration on his
behalf.
The Union stated that though it was ready and willing to
represent Mr. Salinas in the arbitration it could not do so without his participation.

The Union asked for an indefinite adjourn-

ment of the arbitration hearing.
request.

The Company opposed the Union's

I ruled that in the absence of a mutual request for or

an agreement on an adjournment, I was prepared to proceed with
the hearing and would entertain motions.

-2The Company moved that Mr. Salinas' grievance be dismissed
with prejudice because of the failure of the Union to proceed
with the arbitration in view or Mr. Salinas1 refusal to participate and his position that he wanted his case decided in another
forum.

I granted the Company's motion.

Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Impartial Chairman under the collective bargaining agreement
between the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The grievance of Mr. Rafael Salinas
and the Union's request for arbitration on his behalf, are dismissed
with prejudice. The rights, if any,
of Mr. Salinas and the parties in any
other forum are reserved.

DATED: March 22, 1984
STATE OF New York)gs<.
COUNTY OF New York)

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Industrial Union of Marine and
Shipbuilding Workers of America,
(IUMSWA), Local 5

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance No. 9554

and
General Dynamics

Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of grievance
No. 9554 dated August 5, 1981 under the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement?
A hearing was held on November 9, 1983 at which time
representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
was waived.

The Arbitrator's Oath

A stenographic record was taken and the parties

filed post-hearing briefs.
The grievance is on behalf of certain employees
listed in the record who claim they were not
paid additional vacation pay upon their recall
from layoff.
More specif icz'lly , the grievants are those who were laid
off before completing twelve months of active employment within
the year; who received a pro-rated amount of vacation pay for the
time actively worked; who were still on layoff when they reached
their transitional anniversary year (i.e. the third, fifth or
tenth year of service); and who upon recall to work thereafter
received no additional vacation pay for that year.
The Union claims that under the contract those employees
are entitled not just to pro-rated vacation pay upon their lay-

-2off, but to full vacation pay for the entire year at the rate of
pay applicable to their transitional anniversary.
The Company asserts that it paid vacation pay in accordance with the contract and consistent with past practice applied
to hundreds of similar cases.
The burden is on the grieving party, the Union, to prove
its case clearly and convincingly.

The Union's case fails to

meet that standard.
I am not persuaded that the language of Article XIV supports the Union's claim.

The applicable contract clauses make

no specific reference to the factual situation involved here.

I

find no specific provision which stipulates the vacation entitlement of employees who are on layoff a part of a measuring year
and who during their layoff reach and pass their transitional
anniversary and return to active work thereafter.

Instead the

Union relies on the provisions of Section 2(b) which provides
for the payment of vacation pay based on "the employee's normal
rate as of the last Monday in the anniversary month" as supportive of its argument that entitlement to vacation pay includes the
layoff period and that the full vacation pay should be at the
higher rate of the anniversary month.
But Section 4 provides otherwise.

For employees laid-off,

the vacation pay is to be "one-twelfth (l/12th) of the employees
full vacation pay for each month or fraction thereof worked since
his preceding anniversary month."

And Section 5 also provides

-3otherwise.

It calls for a one-twelfth (l/12th) reduction in

hours of eligibility for vacation "for each payroll month the
employee is absent...on layoff...."
If Section 2(b) inferentially

supports the Union's position

Sections 4 and 5, under which the grievants were paid vacations,
are supportive of the Company's action.
Accordingly, the best that can be said for the Union's
theory of the case is that the applicable contract sections are
ambiguous.
Where the contract is ambiguous, the arbitrator looks for
and to past practice for clarity, for interpretation, and for
reconciliation of the various contract clauses.
Here, with the possible exception of a single instance
(and a single exception neither makes nor breaks a practice) the
evidence in the record shows scores of examples of situations
like those involved in this grievance where the Company paid no
additional vacation pay when the employee returned from layoff
after reaching his transitional anniversary.

I am satisfied that

the Union had at least constructive notice of these many cases
as well as the requisite opportunity of actual notice.
Under well settled principles of contract law, this extensive past practice is controlling, especially where, as here,
the applicable contract language can be interpreted either way.
The remaining issue raised by the Union, dealing with the
rates of pay of a few employees who returned to work from layoff
before they reached their transitional anniversary, is not part

-4of grievance 9554.

It is the subject of a different grievance

and hence not part of this arbitration.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
Grievance No. 9554 dated August 5, 1981
is denied.

DATED: November 18, 1984
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) ' * '

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
IUE

Local 359

OPINION and AWARD
Case #1530 0443 83

and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
"Did the grievant, Alfred Hunter, have the
minimum qualifications required under the
provisions of Section 1 of Article XXVIII
to be upgraded to the position of Control
Operator (R-20) in the Intermediates (MCS)
area in November of 1982?"
"If the Arbitrator determines that the grievant did have the minimum qualifications
required for such upgrading, did the Company
violate Article XXVIII when it upgraded
Anthony Martone to the position rather than
the grievant? If so, what shall the remedy
be?"
The parties have negotiated and stipulated that the
"Wirtz formula" is applicable and controlling in this case.
Therefore, not withstanding my earlier decisions in which I
interpreted Section 1 of Article XXVIII differently, it is to
the Wirtz formula that I am now bound.
As applied to this case and as agreed to by the parties,
the Wirtz formula is as follows:
The first issue is whether the grievant had
the minimum qualifications to be upgraded to
the position in question. If the Company agrees or the grievant is found to have met the
minimum qualifications requirement, the issue
is then whether the Company took "into consideration as an important factor the relevant
length of continuous service" of the grievant
when it placed another employee on the job.

-2-

Hearings were held on September 15 and 16, 1983 in
Colonie, New York, at which time the grievant and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived; a stenographic record was
taken; and both sides filed post-hearing briefs.
The grievant, with greater seniority, was bypassed in
his bid for the job of Control Operator.

The Company awarded

the job to Anthony Martone, a junior employee whom it judged
possessed the requisite minimum qualifications.

The Company

determined that the grievant was not minimally qualified.
The question of the grievant's qualifications is the subject
of this dispute and this case.
The Company's right to unilaterally promulgate minimum
qualifications for upgrading to job vacancies and to set forth
those qualifications in the job posting has been sustained in
prior decisions, and is not challenged by the Union in this
case.

For the Control Operator job in question, the posting

required the applicant to have:
.Operating knowledge of the Methyl Chlorosilane production process or similar continuous fluidized bed reaction processes
handling silanes
.Sufficient experience to train inexperienced operators
.Satisfactory work record
The reasonableness

and relevance of the foregoing condi-

tions are also not in dispute.

Rather, the Union contends

-3that the grievant possessed the minimum qualifications to
meet these requirements; and that even if he lacked the
immediate knowledge referred to in item #1 or the experience referred to in item #2, the Company has regularly upgraded senior bidders to Control Operator jobs who possessed
no greater knowledge or experience.
It is the Company's position that the grievant did not
meet the minimum requirements of items 1 and 2.

It concedes

that his work record has been good.
The Union also claims that because the job posting referred only to Control Operator in the Intermediates Work
Area, the grievant should not be held to the Company's imposed higher qualifications standards for the specific job
of Control Operator MCS-2.
At the threshold, it is my conclusion that the Union's
argument on this latter point is unpersuasive.

The fact is

that the vacancy into which the Company intended to place the
successful bidder was in MCS-2.

I consider it a managerial

prerogative to determine where the vacancy occurs, especially
where, as here, the MCS-2 location is part of the overall
Intermediates

area.

So, realistically, it is the minimum

qualifications for the Control Operator MCS-2 that is at issue
Though the Company could have transferred Control Operators
around, thereby possibly freeing up a vacancy with less demanding qualifications, I find no contractual requirement
that it do so.

Therefore the Union's suggestion that the

-4Company should have done so to avoid a dispute over the grievant's eligibility for the MCS-2 job, cannot be contractually
supported.
As I see it, the Wirtz formula is not inconsistant with
my often expressed view, shared I believe by the large majority
of arbitrators, that in matters of ability and qualifications,
the employer's judgment enjoys a presumption of validity unless
shown to be arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or unreasonable.
In the instant case, applying the Wirtz formula and the
foregoing view, I conclude that the Company's determination
that the grievant did not possess the threshold qualifications
for Control Operator MCS-2, should be affirmed.
Assuming that in the first step of his two step formula,
Arbitrator Wirtz interpreted "minimally qualified" to mean "an
ability to perform the job passably," I do not find that the
grievant's disqualification on that basis was arbitrary,capricious, discriminatory or unreasonable.
The Union has not clearly and convincingly shown that
the grievant's good work record in other jobs gave him the
type of knowledge and experience that was transferable to the
Control Operator position to reasonably insure his ability to
perform it "passably."

On the other hand, I cannot find the

methods employed by the Company in judging the grievant's
qualifications to be wrong.

The questions which supervision

posed to the grievant in considering his bid were fully related to the job and its duties and responsibilities as listed

-5-

in the posting.

It is undisputed that the grievant could

not answer those questions or answer them correctly.

As

the questions asked related reasonably to the minimum
qualifications enumerated in the posting, I cannot fault the
Company for deciding that the grievant's inability to respond
correctly meant that he lacked the minimum qualifications for
the job.
This is not to say that the grievant could not perform
the job satisfactorily or that he could not learn and adjust
to its requirements and responsibilities in due time.

Indeed,

the grievant struck me as highly intelligent, poised, stable
and well motivated.

His good work record is stipulated.

Rather it is to say that the Company's process of deciding
on his qualifications; the implementation of that process,
and the consideration of his other work experience, were not
irrelevant, unfair or unreasonable, and that the conclusions
reached were not arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory,
albeit arguably subject to different interpretations.
In short, under the instant circumstances; under the
Wirtz formula; and under the presumptions previously mentioned,
this arbitrator finds no legitimate basis to substitute his
judgment for that of the Company.
The Company has shown by adequate evidence that the
Control Operator MCS-2 has greater responsibilities, requiring
more independent decision making than Control Operators in
other locations.

Though much of the work in MCS-2 with which

-6-

he is concerned is automated, a mistake, accident or the failure
to take prompt remedial or preventative action could be more
serious and dangerous than in other locations where Control
Operators function.

That all Control Operators are paid the

same may be the subject of some other grievance, but standing
alone, it does not rebut the Company's evidence on the difference in responsibilities among them.

Therefore I do not find

it unfair, unreasonable or discriminatory for the Company to
require a higher standard of threshold qualifications for the
job of Control Operator MCS-2.
The main thrust of the Union's case is that the grievant
was no less qualified than a number of other senior bidders
who were upgraded to other Control Operator positions.

The

Union offered substantial evidence of other upgradings where
the senior bidder was awarded a Control Operator job though
he did not meet the qualifications set forth in the posting.
Specifically, the Union showed that in other upgradings to
Control Operator, the senior bidders were not, for example,
"able to train inexperienced operators," nor had they the
knowledge of or experience with the "production

processes"

involved0
Setting aside the previously found fact that the Company
has demonstrated a difference between the Control Operator
MCS-2 and other Control Operators, the Union's argument in
this regard founders on the very Wirtz formula which, by
mutual agreement, is controlling in this case.

Put another

-7-

way, only if a prior practice was consistent with Wirtz would
that practice be probative or precedential.

If not, the Wirtz

formula cannot be preempted by practices contrary thereto.
My analysis of those prior upgradings relied on by the
Union, and about which there were no disputes, grievances or
arbitrations (except the Tarsa case which was settled without
precedent or prejudice), leads me to question whether they were
consistent with the Wirtz formula.

Frankly, I fail to see how

a senior successful bidder who does not possess the qualifications, experience or ability reasonably set forth in the job
posting can be considered to have met the "minimum qualifications" or be "minimally qualified to passably perform the job."
In short, in the absence of more evidence showing that those
undisputed upgrades were mutually agreed to or undertaken as
the correct implementation of the Wirtz formula, I am constrained to view them as mutual arrangements where the Wirtz formula
was not invoked or tested because it was unnecessary to do so,
and not as determinative examples of what a senior bidder is
entitled to within the meaning of Wirtz, when the upgrading
bid is disputed.
Within the meaning of Wirtz, I consider it proper in
the instant case for the Company to have required the grievant,
as the remaining senior bidder, to know enough about the job
he sought and to be sufficiently familiar with its duties and
processes to be able to answer the questions put to him, as
reasonable evidence of his minimum qualifications for the job0

-8That other Control Operators were appointed on a less
demanding basis and in the absence of any dispute or adjudication is no more evidence of what Wirtz means than examples
of pragmatic variations from Wirtz, which the parties, in
those instances, found mutually acceptable.

Hence a reliance

by the Union on those undisputed examples does not clearly and
convincingly show that Wirtz or the contract has been breached
by the Company in the instant matter.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, makes the following AWARD
The grievant, Alfred Hunter did not have
the minimum qualifications required under
the provisions of Section 1 Article XXVIII
to be upgraded to the position of Control
Operator (R-20) in the Intermediates
(MCS)
area in November 1982.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 23, 1984
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) " "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
loU.E., Local 761

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #52-30-0020-84

and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was the termination of Patrick Lay on August
15, 1983 for just cause? If not, what shall
the remedy be?
A hearing was held in Louisville, Kentucky on April 18, 1984
at which time Mr. Lay, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant"
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitra-

tor's Oath was waived; a stenographic record was taken; and the
parties filed post-hearing briefs.
Under the Company's Rules of Conduct, which are not in dispute in this proceeding^, the penalty of discharge may be imposed
for a fourth warning notice within a one year period.

It is un-

disputed and uncontested herein that prior to the incidents which
resulted in his fourth warning notice, the grievant had received
three warning notices within the stated period.
Therefore the question simply is whether the fourth warning
notice was justified.

If so, under the Rules of Conduct, the

grievant's discharge must be sustained.
The grievant's fourth warning notice resulted from his

-2-

absences from work on April 21, May 3 and May 5, 1983.

Under the

Company's Attendance Control Policy (which has been upheld in
prior arbitrations and which is unchallenged in this proceeding)
an employee receives a warning notice for two or more unexcused
absences within a two-and-one-half week period.

The grievant's

absences of April 21, May 3 and May 5 met that chronology and
triggered a warning notice, which because of his accumulated
record, constituted the grievant's fourth.
It is the Union's position that the Company imposed the
fourth warning automatically

and ministerially and failed to con-

sider mitigating circumstances0

The Company acknowledges that

mitigating circumstances are to be considered in the application
of its Rules of Conduct and Attendance Control Policy; that it
considered that factor in this case and that mitigating circumstances were not present.
The grievant and the Union on his behalf explained that ©n
April 21st the battery from the grievant's truck had been stolen;
that on May 3rd the grievant was ill; and that on May 5th his
alarm clock failed to work»
Based on the evidence in the record I cannot conclude that
the Company acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in refusing to
accept those excuses as mitigation.

Under the Attendance Control

Policy, especially where a fourth warning notice is involved (or
also as here, in the face of prior violations) the Company has the
right to require reasonable proof or documentation of the excuses,
including a doctor's statement where illness is claimed.

Based

-3on uniform practice, I am satisfied that the employees,
the grievant, know of these requirements.

including

At meetings at which

the Company sought reasons for the grievant's absences, the griev
ant was unable to produce the requisite documentation.

Under the

c ircumstances I do not think it unreasonable for the Company to
ask for the receipt for the purchase of a new truck battery and
for a copy of the police report which the grievant ultimately
stated had been filed.

These were not or could not be produced

within the reasonable time afforded by the Company during the
investigative stage of this discipline.

Indeed, though the griev

ant claimed he filed a police report, it was not produced even at
the arbitration hearing. Also a medical statement authenticating
the grievant's alleged illness was not produced.
claimed that he did not see a doctor.

The grievant

At the terminal stage of

the Control Policy, and as previously stated, it is not unfair or
unreasonable for such a statement to be required and for the
employee to be expected to see a doctor in order to substantiate
the claim of illness.
An alarm clock malfunction or problem is uniformly unacceptable as an excuse under circumstances of this type.
Accordingly, and in short, I am unable to conclude that the
Company failed to consider mitigating circumstances in this case0
That documentation may be available somewhere or is now produced
begs the issue.

It was not produced when needed and any after

production cannot now be retroactively supportive of a claim that

-4mitigating factors were ignored.

Indeed, assuming arguendo that

the battery theft explanation was accurate, the Company established
that at the time the grievant lived adjacent to the plant; could
have walked to work; and even if he made a police report and
bought a new battery, could have come to work late, thereby avoiding an absence.

That he did not, together with his questionable

assertions regarding the filing of a police report, support the
Company's contentions that no valid mitigating circumstances were
present.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The termination of Patrick Lay on August 15,
1983 was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 2, 1984
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)38':
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 773, I.U.E.

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 5230 0158-84

and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharges of
James McNabb, Nommie Hood, and Ronald Strack?
If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Cincinnati, Ohio on August 29, 1984
at which time the above named employees, hereinafter referred to
as the "grievants"

and representatives of the above named Union

and Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed

post-hearing briefs.
The grievants were discharged for falsifying their time
cards.

They are accused of leaving work about two hours before

the end of their shift, not returning thereafter and having
arranged to have their time cards punched by someone else at the
end of the shift.

They deny the charge.

The Company's case is based on the testimony of foreman
James E. Madden.

While "staked out" in a hidden area and making

observations for a different purpose, (as part of an investigation
of thefts) he states that he saw the grievants leave the plant at
4:35 AM, enter a car belonging to one of them and drive off the
property.

He testified that he maintained his observations until

-2about 7:20 AM, leaving his position for only a few minutes to
make observations from another location, and that at no time did
the grievants return to the plant at or before the end of the
shift.

That the grievants' time cards were punched out at 6:30

AM led Madden and the Company to conclude that the cards were
fraudulently punched by someone else based on pre-arrangement
with the grievants.
I conclude that what the foreman said he saw is accurate
and truthful.

All his other time recordings of the activity of

the period of his observation coincide with the time cards of
the other employees he observed.

As there is nothing in the

record to support any assertion that he had reason to falsify his
testimony and observations of the grievants, I conclude that his
testimony that they left the plant at 4:35 AM and then left the
Company's premises by car, is what actually happened.
I further find that the conclusions that the grievants did
not return to the plant that shift and by consequence had arranged
to have their time cards punched by someone else, are reasonable
and logical, and based on sufficient probative evidence for
disciplinary purposes (recognizing

that this is not a criminal

proceeding nor an offense which parallels a crime).
Madden testified that when the grievants left at 4:35 PM
they were dressed in street clothes.

Not only did they leave the

plant and the premises by car but grievant's Strack's van which
was parked in the parking lot at the time was still there the next:
morning after the shift ended.

I am persuaded that that meant

-3that Strack did not return to clock out at 6:30 AM, and I am
similarly persuaded that neither did the other two grievants.
That being so, I accept Madden's testimony that despite no record
ings by him of in and out of the plant activities after 5:40 AM
he nonetheless maintained his observations until 7:20 AM; that
the grievants did not return and that he was not away from his
observation post long enough to have missed their return.
Under those circumstances, there can be no logical explanation for the 6:30 AM punch-outs on the grievants' time cards
except that the grievants had arrangeed for someone else to do
it for them.

That inference and that conclusion may be properly

drawn in this type of disciplinary case.
Under the Company's Code of Conduct this kind of time card
misconduct or record falsification is a violation which "will
normally result in discharge for the first offense."

I am not

persuaded by the Union's assertion that the Company has tolerated
or even participated in similar time clock violations which would
render the penalties in this case discriminatory or unevenhanded.
There are clear distinctions.

In the instant case the grievants

arranged a falsification of their time cards without the knowledge, participation or acquiesence of management.

In the other

instances cited by the Union, the time clock variations were
sanctioned and approved or administratively participated in by
supervision, and hence, though arguably irregular, could not be
deemed as a fraud on the Company.

Moreover, only small amounts

of time were involved or the time allowances were time compensa-

-4tions for other extra time worked, and hence not "falsifications.
Additionally, I do not accept the Union's argument
that
"
the Code of Conduct and the proscription on this particular
offense were not well publicized to and known by the employees.
I am satisfied that the Company posted and disseminated the Code
and enunciated the prohibitions sufficiently for purposes of
enforcement.
What I do find however, is a type of "contributory
negligence" by the Company and an uneven application of discipline
for an offense of equal severity going on at the very time that
the grievants were engaged in their misconduct. By the latter I
mean the testimony of Madden that other employees that night and
morning on the same shift, went in and out of the plant during
times they should have been at work; that they were drinking
beer and even took beer back into the plant.
In my view, and as codified in the Code of Conduct, use or
possession of intoxicants on Company property also "will normally
result in discharge for the first offense."
serious as a time card falsification.

Hence it is as

Yet the employees observed

drinking beer in the parking lot, and bringing it into the plant
were not fired, but rather suspended for short periods of time.
As to what I characterize as "contributory negligence,"
it is undisputed that the shift on which all this took place was
left unsupervised.

In order to engage in the "stake-out" Madden

had not only left his supervisory post that night and early morning, but, to cover his real purpose, led the employees to believe

-5that he was "going hunting."

Supervision of course is for a

number of purposes including production, instruction, and
significantly in this case, for the maintenance of discipline
and compliance with the work rules.
Though not condoned, it is not surprising that when there
is no supervision, especially on a night and early morning shift,
employees are tempted to take advantage and engage in wrongful
activities.

Hence, though the employees involved in work rule

violations and especially the grievants are not to be fully excused from or relieved of the consequences of their improprieties
I think the Company should bear part of the responsibility for
creating the circumstances which contributed to the acts of
misconduct.
For the two foregoing reasons - namely the responsibility
I attach to the Company for failure to maintain supervision on
the shift and because other employees engaged in drinking beer
and bringing beer into the plant were not punished as severely
as the grievants, I shall rule that the grievants1 discharges
should be reduced to suspensions.

As the degree of seriousness

among the various acts of misconduct on that shift may be subject
to legitimate debate, and recognizing the very serious nature of
the grievants1 offenses, I shall not equate the grievants1
suspensions with the suspensions imposed on the other employees.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:

-6Under the particular facts of this case there
was not just cause for the discharges of James
McNabb, Nommie Hood and Ronald Strack.
Their discharges are reduced to suspensions.
They shall be reinstated without back pay and
the period of time from their discharges to
their return to work shall be deemed disciplinary
suspensions for their misconduct.

DATED: November 18, 1984
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York ) ' '

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
IUE,

Radio and Machine Workers,
Local 191

OPINION and AWARD
Case #3030 0034 84

and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Article VI, Section 4
(a) and (b) of the 1979-1982 National Agree ment when the piece price for assemble, weld,
test, repair and flush tube unit radiators
was changed on April 27, 1982? If so, what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Atlanta, Georgia on June 26, 1984
at which time representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

A stenographic record was

taken and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
Article VI Section 4 (a) and (b) of the contract reads:
4.

Piece Prices-Hourly Rated Piecework Employees

(a) Piece prices are classified as standard, temporary or special and all piecework vouchers will
indicate the classification.
(1) A Standard Piece Price is one set where the
manufacturing method has become established.
(2) A Temporary Piece Price is one set where the
manufacturing method is under development or has
been changed, or the average pieceworker on the
job has not yet attained normal performance.
(3) A Special Piece Price is one set on work which

-2usually repeats infrequently or is in small
quantities or has some special feature or
purpose.
(b) There will be no change in a standard
price except where there is a change in
manufacturing method.
Where such a change in manufacturing method
is made, the price may be adjusted. However,
such adjustment shall be limited to those
parts of the job affected by the change.
In order that the operator will be able to
make the same hourly earnings under a new
price where a change in manufacturing method
is made which does not reduce the job value
on which the original price was computed, the
adjusted price will be in direct proportion
to the change in allowed time for the part of
the job affected by the new method. When a
price is reduced on such jobs, the employee
and his representative will be given at least
one week's notice that the price is to be
changed.
The method changes in the instant case upon which the
Company relied in making a rate change and which tightened
the rate are:
(1) Slag box I.D., and
(2) Tap outholes and asm pipe plug.
Item #1 above is also identified in the record as wire
welding with resulting flux residue or slag.
Prior to the disputed rate change, the job of assemble,
weld, test, repair and flush tube unit radiators carried a
Standard Piece Price.

That Standard Piece Price was determined

and made effective in 1973, based on a piece rate and method
audit at that time.
I am persuaded that there is an orderly, albeit implicit

-3chronological schedule for rate changes under Article VI
Section 4 (a) and (b) of the contract.

Once a Standard Piece

Price has been determined, the methods of the job existing at
that time are deemed to be reflected in the Standard Rate.

It

is noted that the contract provides that a Standard Piece Price
"is one set where the manufacturing method has become established
(emphasis added).

In other words, it is contractually assumed

that a Standard Price reflects all the methods in place at the
time a Standard Price is fixed.

It follows then that method

changes which allow subsequent price changes are method changes
which take place in point of time after a Standard Piece Price
has been affixed to the job.

Included in such method changes

would be also those which may have begun inconsequentially or
insignificantly prior to the fixing of a Standard Piece Price,
but which matured thereafter into a demonstrable and measurable
method change.

Upon the latter event, a change in the Standard

Piece Price might be proper.
But, I am not persuaded that a Standard Piece Price can
be impeached by re-rating a job because of method changes which
took place before the Standard Price is determined and fixed,
even if the change is not discovered until after the Standard
Price is affixed to the job.
Applied to the instant case, the Company's right to change
the Piece Price must be based on its showing of changes in the
manufacturing method which have in fact come into being or
"matured" after 1973 when the Standard Piece Price was established

-4With regard to one of the two method changes in this case,
the Company has not met that burden.

During the hearing, it

became apparent, based on Company testimony, that the wire welding and the residue or flux produced thereby was part of the job
in 1973 and at that time it was performed in the same manner and
with the same magnitude as it was being performed in 1982 when
the Company reduced the Standard Piece Price.

Thus this method

change does not qualify as a gradual or "maturing" change to
which I have previously referred.
Therefore to allow the Company to reduce the piece price
based in part on a change in the methods of welding wire (and
attendant work as a result of that welding) would permit the
Company to go behind and impeach a Standard Piece Price which
was set, as the contract provides, "where the manufacturing
method has become established."
The inconsistency and hence impermissability of any such
action by the Company in the face of the latter contract language
and contract finality of a Standard Piece Price is obvious.
Accordingly, I find that one of the two "method changes"
relied on by the Company, does not contractually qualify for the
purpose used by the Company in this case.

That being so, it is

manifest that the nature of the price change effectuated by the
Company was violative of the contract.
The Arbitrator's authority is not to review the validity
of the new Price, nor to calculate a different Price.
is confined to deciding whether the action

Rather it

of changing the Price

-5based on method changes, was contractually proper.

Based on

the foregoing findings, the Company's action was not in accordance with the contract, and hence must be reversed.

It is un-

necessary therefore to deal with or make determinations regarding the other alleged method change relating to "tap out holes
and assemble pipe plug."

The rights of the parties on this

latter method are reserved.
Determinations solely on the method "tap out holes and
assemble pipe plug" raises such questions as whether the Company
could change the Price based only on this method (assuming it
was a method change subsequent to 1973) and whether any such
Price change was mathematically correct.

Those questions are

not within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator in this case.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company violated Article VI Sections 4
(a) and (b) of the 1979-1982 GE-IUE National
Agreement when the Piece Price for assemble,
weld, test, repair and flush tube unit radiator
was changed on April 27, 1982. The Piece Price
so established is voided; the prior rate is reestablished, and the affected employees shall
be made whole.

DATED: December 20, 1984
STATE OF New York )
'oo
COUNTY OF New York ) "'

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Greater New York Health Care Facilities
Association, On Behalf Of Its Members
and

AWARD

Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing Home
and Allied Services Union, S.E.I.U.,
AFL-CIO

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
Union and Association, makes the following AWARD:
The Union's motion that the Association's
petition on behalf of its members for the
"307o forgiveness" be dismissed with prejudice, is granted.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: June 25, 1984
STATE OF New York )ss. :
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

E R I C J.

SCHMERTZ

P.C.
HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL or LAW
HEMPSTEAD, NEW YORK nsso
(516) seO-585-4

June 25, 1984
Mr. Peter Ottley
President
Local 144, S.E.I.U.
233 West 49th Street
New York, N. Y. 10019
Mr. Bartholomew J. Lawson
Executive Director
Greater New York Health Care
Facilities Association
2 Dag Hammarskjold Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10017
Robert A. Cantore, Esq.
Vladeck, Waldman, Elias
& Engelhard, P 0 C.
1501 Broadway
New York, N. Y. 10036
Jeffrey R. Cohn, Esq.
Greater New York Health Care
Facilities Association
2 Dag Hammarskjold Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10017
RE: Greater New York Health Care
Facilities Association -andLocal 144 S.E.I.U. "30% Forgiveness"
Gentlemen:
I enclose my duly executed Award in the above matter.
Very t/uly yours,

EJSrhl

Eric7
Schmertz
Arbitrator

ii
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
District 15, AIMAW

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 1559 83

and

Kentile Floors, Inc

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
David Perez? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on August 17, 1984 at which time Mr. Perez
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
Based on the particular circumstances of this case, and without precedent for any other matter, I find that the penalty of
discharge was too severe, and I reduce that penalty to a disciplinary suspension.
The grievant was discharged for insubordination, walking off
the job and for being under the influence of alcohol while at work
The charges relate to certain events at the Banbury machine on
October 21, 1983.
Despite the Company's allegation regarding the grievant's
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conduct on October 21st, the Company witnesses readily concede
that otherwise the grievant was "quiet and cooperative and a good
worker."
Generally, as is well settled in arbitral law and industrial
relations, an Employer has the right to impose discipline including discharge on an employee who is insubordinate or who is at
work under the influence of alcohol, especially where safety of
persons and equipment are involved.

Those rights are among those

reserved by the Company under this collective bargaining relationship by its promulgation of Company Rules and Regulations, particularly Rules No. 2 and 3 thereof.

Of course, the factual circum-

stances of the events leading to any such disciplinary action and
the propriety of the penalty, especially the extreme penalty of
discharge under the circumstances, are subject to the grievance
and arbitration provisions of the contract.
However, it is well settled, and is applicable under this
collective bargaining relationship, that if serious offenses of
insubordination or unfitness for duty due to the consumption of
alcohol, are shown, discipline including summary discharge should
be sustained by an arbitrator regardless of the employee's prior
record and whether or not progressive discipline had been applied,
In the instant case I conclude that the grievant acted
irresponsibly by drinking some beers before coming to work
(especially when he acknowledges that he is an alcoholic.)
ing his medical problem,

Know-

having previously undertaken treatment

for it for a year before be joined the Company, and therefore
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responsible for knowing the probable adverse effect it would have
on him while at work, he had a special duty to refrain from drinking before reporting for work.

For that irresponsibility and

disregard of his special duty, he is subject to discipline.
However, I cannot find that the evidence supports a conclusion that he was drunk or "under the influence" of alcohol.

He

was performing his work satisfactorily and without difficulty.
Though he was animated and "loud" and alcohol was smelled on his
breath, there was no testimony of the other regularly
symptoms of drunkenness.

required

There is no evidence that his speech

was slurred, or his eyes glassy, red or watering, or his gait
unsteadyo

No blood alcohol test was taken (though I do not hold

that any such procedure is required).

Accordingly I do not find

that the grievant was "under the influence of alcohol" within the
traditional meaning of that phrase and within the meaning of that
charge as set forth in the Employee Disciplinary Notice of
October 21, 1983.
Considering the grievant's actions alone, he was insubordinate when he refused to comply with the supervisor's order to
"step aside and let the mechanic open the Banbury side door,"
when he walked away from the work place (to get a drink of water
or otherwise) after being instructed to remain, and when he engaged in an argument with the supervisor about the performance
of the work in question.

But I find that though the supervisor

did not intend to provoke the grievant, the grievant had reason
able grounds to believe that he had been provoked.

Provocation
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is a defense to insubordination.

I do not find that the grievant

had any such complete defense here, but rather that the particular events at the time created mitigating circumstances which
warrant a lesser disciplinary penalty for the offense.

The evi-

dence discloses that when the foreman instructed the grievant to
stop unbolting the door and to step aside to let the mechanic do
it alone, he placed his hand on the grievant's chest, and with a
pushing motion, guided the grievant backward and away from the
location of the door.

I think the supervisor did not intend to

use physical force for intimidating or confrontational purposes.
I think, probably, it was automatic rather than adversarial.
ever, I am not persuaded it was needed.

Considering

How-

the fact that

at other times the grievant often opened the Banbury door and was
permitted if not instructed to do so by his regular week-day

super

visor, I am not surprised that he was startled and then annoyed
when told on this day to refrain from doing so, and thereafter
angered, when the foreman used a physical gesture to remove him
from the area.

In short, I do not excuse him from his failure and

refusal to follow instructions, but rather find a relevant element
of mitigation.

The balance of the incident, including "walking

off the job" was part of the same "transaction" and hence does not
require separate attention herein.
Finally, in addition to the Company's acknowledgement that
the grievant was otherwise a good and cooperative employee, I
found the grievant to be contrite and regretful about the event,
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with an apparent understanding that it probably had its origins
in his drinking.

He expressed a readiness and willingness to

return to an active alcohol program.

In short, I think that the

incident of October 21st was uncharacteristic of what can be expected of him as an employee and not an example of chronic misbehavior or defiance of managerial authority.
think he is entitled to another chance.

On that basis I

He is warned however

that if I am wrong, and he commits future violations of Company
rules, he would be subject to dismissal.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of David Perez is reduced to a
disciplinary suspension. He shall be reinstated but without back pay. The period of
time from his discharge to his reinstatement
shall be the disciplinary suspension for his
offenses of October 21, 1983. Additionally,
he shall be required to actively participate
in an acceptable alcohol rehabilitation program and remain in that program for the pa riod
prescribed.

DATED: August 20 , 1984
STATE OF New York )„«,
.
' 0O •
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
•

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

f
J
PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Impasse Among the
Trustees of the Local 702 Pension Fund
OPINION
and
and
the Local 702 Welfare Fund
AWARD

The question to be answered is whether the firm Graubard,
Markovitz, McGoldrick, Dannett & Horowitz, as counsel to the
employer trustees of the above named Funds should receive from
the Funds annual retainers equal to the retainers received by
the firm Lewis, Greenwald & Kennedy, P.C., counsel to the Union
trustees.
A hearing was held on August 21, 1984 at which time representatives of the Funds and the law firms involved appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Both sides filed post-hearing

memoranda.
The question is answered in the affirmative for the reason
that the Trustees resolved the question by their votes of January
17, 1984.

The Resolutions adopted that day by the unanimous vote

of the Trustees of both Funds granted the Graubard, Markovitz,
McGoldrick, Dannett & Horowitz firm the same annual retainer as
Lewis, Greenwald & Kennedy, P.C., specifically $8400 a year from
the Welfare Fund and $9600 a year from the Pension Fund.
I liken this situation to a circumstance where a grievance
has been settled during the grievance procedure by authorized
representatives of the parties, but the Union thereafter attempts
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to submit the original dispute to arbitration in denial of or in
an effort to reverse the settlement.

Here the Trustees decided

the matter by unanimous Resolution in January 1984.

I find no

compelling reason why that Resolution should now be impeached by
arbitration.

That the Union Trustees subsequent to the Resolu-

tion sought its revocation, to which the employer Trustees refused to agree may create a technical impasse, but to my mind
and under these particular circumstances, it is not an impasse
which contractually opens up for a new adjudication and decision
what was unanimously decided by the Trustees a few months earlier
This is not to say that a bonafide impasse among the Trustees
cannot occur on an issue previously decided by them.

Rather it

is to say that when a motion to revoke or rescind a previously
unanimous Resolution is made shortly after that Resolution, there
should be new or previously unknown facts or circumstances which
warrant a de novo consideration.

A mere change of mind by one of

the contractual parties or by a set of Trustees should not be
sufficient.

Here, the record does not disclose any significantly

new or previously unknown or unascertained facts or conditions
which would support a re-opening in arbitration of the Resolutions
of January 17, 1984.
The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the relevant
Trust Agreements, and having duly heard the proofs and allegation
of the parties involved in the above captioned dispute, makes the
following AWARD:

-3The Resolutions of January 17, 1984 of the
Trustees of the Local 702 Welfare Fund and
the Local 702 Pension Fund are affirmed and
enforced. Pursuant to those Resolutions the
firm of Graubard, Moskovitz, McGoldrick,
Dannett and Horowitz is entitled to annual
fees of $8400 from the Welfare Fund and $9600
from the Pension Fund.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: October 16, 1984
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) *
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communication Workers of America
and

OPINION AND AWARD
CWA Case No. 1-84-116
N.Y. Telco Case No. A-84-73

New York Telephone Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was the two day suspension of Robert Schmalzigan
on April 2, 1984 without just cause?
A hearing was held on September 20, 1984 at which time
representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
briefs.

The

The parties filed post-hearing

This Opinion and Award is rendered within five working

days of receipt of the briefs as required by Article 45.03d of
the contract.
Mr. Schmalizagan, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" was suspended for refusing to cooperate with the
Company's investigation of an alleged physical altercation
between the grievant and his supervisor.

The Company deemed

the grievant*s refusal to answer the investigative questions
of the Company's security personnel as an act of insubordination.
As the offense charged is as stated above, it is
unnecessary for me to determine whether the altercation
actually took place or whether the grievant's report to the
police was accurate in any respect. What is questioned is
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whether the Company has the right to conduct an independent
investigation and if so, whether the grievant had a duty to
cooperate with that inquiry.
I answer both the foregoing questions in the affirmative.

The Union errs when it argues that the altercation was

"not job related" but rather a personal matter "between two
citizens of the United States,"

Also I must disagree with

the Union's claim that the matter was exclusively criminal
in nature and not subject to investigation by the employer.
The fact is that the alleged altercation took place between
two Company employees, a supervisor and an hourly employee;
it took place on Company property, on the job, and presumably during working hours.

A relationship between two such

employees which is characterized by a charge of assault is
clearly a matter of legitimate concern for the Company.

In-

deed the failure of the Company to inquire into the circumstances and take remedial or preventative action if needed,
would open the Company to potential charges of negligence or
even complicity.

In this case the assault charge was made by

the grievant to the authorities.

Having done so, the grievant

should have expected that the Company would investigate the
facts for any needed employment related action.

As he started

the chain of events, and as the events he alleged involved
employees of the Company in the job setting, the grievant was
responsible to cooperate with all the legitimate investigations
that resulted.

I deem the Company's investigation to have been

-3legitimate, and the grievant's refusal to cooperate by declining to answer the questions of the Company's investigators
was defiantly wrong.

I do not quarrel with the Company's

classification of it as insubordination.
Whether the Company had the police report by the time
it began its own investigation is immaterial.
disagree on whether it did or not).

(The parties

A police report is for

criminal or civil investigation and possible action.

The

elements of such actions may be different from disciplinary
matters under the contract.

Hence the Company is not required

to rely on a police report for the facts of the event.

As its

interests and possible actions are different from a criminal
or civil prosecution or suit, it is entitled to collect its
own information on what happened.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The two day suspension of Robert Schmalzigan
was not without just cause. The suspension
is sustained.

Eric J. Schmertz
DATED: October 15, 1984
STATE OF New York)
COUNTY OF New York) " * "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union Nos. 310, 314, 315, 319,
322, 329, 330 and 337, Brotherhood
of Utility Workers of New England

AWARD
of
ARBITRATORS

and
Massachusetts Electric Company
and Narragansett Electric Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of Arbitration in the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above named parties, make the following
AWARD:
The Unions have not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the introduction of
video display terminal equipment in the Copany's Customer Service Department warrants
any increase in the pay rate for the employees
in the classifications set forth in the stipulated issue.
As requested by the parties, the Board of
Arbitration retains jurisdiction for the
purposes stipulated.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

John J. Langan
Concurring

DATED: January 30, 1984
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) * '

George P. Fogarty
Dissenting

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.
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DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
I, John J. Langan do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
I, George P. Fogarty do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union Nos. 310, 314, 315, 319,
322, 329, 330 and 337, Brotherhood
of Utility Workers of New England
and

OPINION
of
CHAIRMAN

Massachusetts Electric Company
and Narragansett Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Does the introduction of video display terminal
equipment in the Company's Customer Service Department warrant any increase in the rate of pay
for employees in the classifications as follows:
As to Narragansett: Customer relations clerk,
clerk customer service, clerk senior inquiry,
clerk senior, clerk stenographer.
As to Massachusetts Electric Company: Clerk customer service and senior clerk.
If so, what increase in rates of pay is appropriate ?
The parties also stipulated that the Board of Arbitration
shall hear the case involving the classification clerk customer
service at both Narragansett and Massachusetts Electric and
render a decision with regard to that particular job classification in both locations, but that the Board will retain jurisdiction after rendering that decision to afford the parties an
opportunity to work out the application of that decision to the
other job classifications.
If they can work it out, that would complete the case.

If

not, the Board would be reconvened for purposes of hearing cases
with regard to the other classifications.
In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the
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collective bargaining agreement between the above named parties
the Undersigned was selected as the Chairman of the Board of
Arbitration, and Messrs. George P. Fogarty and John J. Langan
were named respectively as the Union and Company members of
said Board.
Hearings were held on April 27 and July 19, 1983 at which
time representatives of the above named Unions and Companies
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

A stenographic record was

taken; both sides filed post-hearing briefs, and the Board of
Arbitration met in executive session on December 21, 1983.
As the stipulated issue indicates, the Companies changed
the methods of the work of the variously classified customer
service clerks from certain manual methods and methods using
less sophisticated communication and informational equipment,
to the primary use of video display terminals.
There is no significant dispute between the parties over
the nature of the work performed by the affected employees and
classifications before and after the introduction of the video
display equipment.
What is in dispute is the affect on the employees, physica]
mental, medical and psychological, by the extensive, if not
almost exclusive use of the video display terminals (with attendant telephone headsets).
Let me come right to the point.

It is apparent to me

-3that the issue turns on the testimony of the two experts, Dr.
Gavriel Salvendy and Dr. Harry L. Snyder, who, respectively,
were the key witnesses of the Unions and the Companies.
As the parties well know from the record, these two experts gave divergent views in the critical areas, on the impact
on employees and on the jobs in question, by the introduction
of the video display equipment.

Both men enjoy impressive pro-

fessional credentials; both are apparent authorities in the
field; and both were unquestionably sincere and convinced of
the validity of their differing points of view.
I found their testimony to be tremendously

interesting;

impressively scholarly; well documented by knowledge, experience
and research; and mutually offsetting.

And I find nothing else

of sufficient probative value in the record including my own
observations of the jobs to change the resultant inconclusiveness.
In this case, no less than in any other, there is the
burden, here on the Unions, to prove the case and the merits of
the grievance by clear and convincing evidence.

Because the

substance of the Unions' case (and that of the Companies too)
rests on the testimony of its expert, and because as good and
as impressive as that testimony was, it is offset by equally
professional and persuasive expert testimony to the contrary,
I am unable to conclude that the Unions' assertions of substantial and adverse psysiological, mental and psychological effects
on the employees in the classifications involved, have been shown

-4by the requisite clear and convincing standard.
Specifically, by example, in the face of the intensely
differing views of the experts (as well as the other evidence
in the record) on the matter of the amount and effect of the
"constraint" placed on the employee by the use of the video
display terminal, as compared to the "constraint" (or lack
thereof) when the job was more manual, I am unable to find an
evidential basis which would give the Unions' case on this point
the persuasiveness

required for its affirmation.

In short, on the matter of "constraint" I do not find
such an increase in "constraint" as to have the kind of physical,
mental or psychological impact on the employee which would
justify a wage increase.

The job has changed with the intro-

duction of the display equipment.

In some respects the evidence

shows that the job duties are now easier, and the work load
lighter.

This is not to say that the changes have not produced

new tensions, anxieties, and different if not unpleasant mental
and physical demands and consequences.

Rather it is to say that

the offsetting critical evidence and testimony do not show a
convincing consequence of the change which now endows the job
with added demands, increased responsibility, additional workload, or more pointedly, a psysiological or psychological impact
warranting a new evaluation and a higher level of compensation.
Finally, as to the ergonomic aspects of the job, the
matters cited by the Unions are no longer significantly present.
The Companies have made most

if not all of the physical changes

-5in chairs, desks, lighting, decor, etc., which related to that
phase of the job complaints.

There is no evidence that for the

period before those ergonomic improvements were made

the em-

ployees suffered any ill effects for which they should now be
additionally compensated.
For the foregoing reasons, I would deny the grievance.
In my view, under the circumstances the matter is best left
for collective

bargaining.

DATED: January 30, 1984

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

E R I C J. SCH M ERTZ P. C.
HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
HEMPSTEAD, NEW YORK II55O
(516) S6O-5854

January 10, 1984

Richard L. O'Hara, Esq.
Colleran, O'Hara, Kennedy
& Mills, P.C.
1044 Franklin Avenue
Garden City, New York 11530
Joseph Rosenthal, Esq.
1140 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036

RE: Local 100 TWU -andNew York Bus Co.
(Spink and Spacek Arbitration)
Gentlemen:
This is in reply to Mr. O'Hara's letter of December
15, 1983 regarding the above matter.
May I have the Company's position on this matter.
Very truly yours,

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
EJS:hl

January 10, 1984

Richard L. O'Hara, Esq.
Colleran, O'Hara, Kennedy
& Mills, P.C.
1044 Franklin Avenue
Garden City, New York 11530
Joseph Rosenthal, Esq.
1140 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036

RE-: Local 100 TWU -andNew York Bus Co.
(Spink and Spacek Arbitration)
Gentlemen:
This is in reply to Mr. O'Hara's letter of December
15, 1983 regarding the above matter.
May I have the Company's position on this matter.
Very truly yours,

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
EJS:hl

COLLERAN, O'HARA, KENNEDY & MILLS, p, c.
1O44 FRANKLIN AVENUE
WALTER M.GOLLEHAN (RETIRED)
RICHARD L.O'HAHA
ROBERT A. KENNEDY
JOHN F. MILLS
STANLEY Q.CASEY

GARDEN CITY,N.Y. 11530
516 CH 8-5757

Hnoo F. RICCA, JH.
VINCENT F. O'HAHA
DAVID WESTER^ ANN, JR.
MICHAEL I, RUSSELL
DAVID J. ABESHOTJSE

December 15, 1983

STEPHANIE SUABEZ (PARALEGAL)
BETTY ANN HOLZER (PARALEGAL)

Eric J. Schmertz, Dean
Hofstra University
School of Law
Hempstead, New York 11550
Re:

Local 100 TWU -and- New York Bus Co,
(Spink and Spacek^arbitration)

Dear Dean Schmertz:
This letter will serve as a petition for the
restoration of the above named grievants to their
jobs as regular bus drivers. They have been unemployed
since being taken out of service in June, 1983, In
support of this petition I enclose a letter from each
grievant dated December 1, 1983 indicating an agreement
to totally abstain from marijuana or any controlled
substance.
On the basis of the punishment already inflicted
as well as their letters, I respectfully request that
you direct their immediate restoration to their positions
as bus drivers.
Very_^truly yours,

RICHARD L. O'HARA
RLO/dm
Encl.
cc:

Joseph Rosenthai, Esq.
Harry Greenbaum, Esq.
Sonny Hall
Joseph Castorina

December 1, 1983
Richard O'Hara, Esq.
1044 Franklin Avenue
Garden City, New York 11530

Dear Mr. O'Hara,
This is to advise that I wish to be reinstated in
my former position as a bus operator with the New York
Bus Company.
This shall further confirm that I agree not to use
marijuana or any controlled substance at any time.

Very truly yours,

December 1, 1983
Richard O ' H a r a , E s q .
1044 Franklin Avenue
Garden City, New York 11530

Dear Mr. O'Hara,
This is to advise that I wish to be reinstated in
my former position as a bus operator with the New York
Bus Company.
This shall further confirm that I agree not to use
marijuana or any controlled substance at any time.

Very truly yours,
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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS
UNION OF AMERICA -and- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 Transport Workers
Union of America

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

In my Award of October 24, 1983 involving grievants Peter
Spacek and William Spink I stated inter alia:
I retain jurisdiction over the application
and implementation of this case. The grievants are not barred forever from returning
to bus driving. That question may be a matter for discussion by the parties in the upcoming contract negotiations. Also, after the
passage of some time, and consistent with the
provisions of the contract and any proper rules
that may then be in effect, the Union may petition the Impartial Chairman to restore the grievants to jobs as regular bus drivers, and for
rulings of how, if the petition is granted, the
Company and the public may be protected from
any similar or subsequent use by the grievants
of marijuana or other prohibited substances.
Subsequent to that Award, the parties negotiated as part
of their new and current collective bargaining agreement, a provision which would make the factual circumstances of the original
case and as referred to in my Award of October 24, 1983, grounds
for discharge and under which "the Company and the public may be
protected from any similar or subsequent use by the grievants
/or any other driver (E.J.S.)~T of marijuana or other prohibited
substances."

-2In support of the Union's petition on behalf of the
grievants for their reinstatement as bus drivers, I have received
duly signed letters from Messrs. Spacek and Spink, both dated
December 1, 1983, and both reading:
" This is to advise that I wish to be
reinstated in my former position as a
bus operator with the New York Bus
Company.
This shall further confirm that I agree not to use marijuana for any controlled substance at any time."
I am satisfied that the circumstances I would require to
permit the grievants return to and resume their positions as
bus drivers, are now met.

Under the new contract provision and

in view of the promises of the grievants in their letters of
December 1, 1983, the Union's petition for the forthwith
restoration of the grievants to positions as bus drivers,
is granted.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: March 12, 1984
STATE OF New York)oc
.
So*.
COUNTY OF New York)
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my Award„

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA -and- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
AWARD
and
OPINION

Local 100, Transport Workers Union
of Greater New York

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer have just cause to discharge
Ramon Regina? If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on April 10, 1984 at which time Mr.
Regina, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The grievant was discharge from his job as a bus driver
because of a record of accidents.
I find that the grievant's accident record was excessive
for the period of his employment; that his accident

"contacts"

were significantly greater than other drivers similarly situated;
that the last in the series of accidents was serious, causing
considerable damage; that discipline for the accident record,
especially the last accident was warranted; but that the penalty
of discharge was at this point, too severe.
The grievant was involved in a total of fifteen accidents
over a two and one-half year period.

All but the last were
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minor in nature, with little or no damage.

The Employer

classifies four as "chargeable," four as "preventable" and
seven as "non-chargeable."

Undisputedly the last accident, in

the "chargeable" category in which the grievant's bus struck a
truck which had stopped ahead, was serious and resulted in over
$13,000 in damage to the bus.
I do not hold that the Employer's right to discipline including ultimate discharge, is limited to "chargeable" and/or
"preventable" accidents.

(I find no need in this case to define

these categories or to judge the accuracy or propriety of the
Employer's definitions).

Rather, I accept the general existence

of a psychological, conscious or unconscious disposition or
state of being "accident-prone."

It appears to me that this

condition may afflict the grievant in addition to his probable
negligence or inattention in connection with a few of the
accidents.

As the Employer provides public transportation

services to the community, it has a high duty of care and is
required to take all reasonable and appropriate steps to insure
the safety of its vehicles and drivers.

Therefore, "accident

proneness" as well as accident culpability are grounds for
discipline, including ultimate discharge.

However, on the other

hand, a driver is not an "absolute insurer" that

his driving

will be totally accident free, and a single serious accident,
like the grievant's last, even when joined by a series of other
minor accidents is not, under the circumstances of this case,
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grounds for summary dismissal.
Like any traditional condition of "poor or unsatisfactory
work," a driver with an accident record is entitled to the
disciplinary impact and the potentially rehabilitative effort
and effect of progressive discipline, unless that record or a
particular accident(s) is so obviously and egregiously
negligence or wilfullness as to warrant summary dismissal.

I

am not persuaded that the grievant's record, including the last
accident has yet risen to that latter level.
All but the last accident were minor.
grievant's fault in any respect.

Most were not the

Commendably, the Employer

acknowledged that it tried to rehabilitate the grievant with
counseling and warnings.

That being so, the Company should have

utilized the next traditional step of progressive discipline,
a suspension, before imposing the ultimate penalty of discharge.
It is well known and well settled, that a suspension is
an effective tool of both warning and attempted rehabilitation.
More than a warning alone, it puts the offending employee on
specific and tangible notice by depriving him of working time
and pay, that his record is unsatisfactory, that it will not
be much longer tolerated, and that unless improved to a satisfactory level, will result in discharge.
Under the particular circumstances of this case, where
the Employer properly warned the grievant in an effort to rehabilitate him; where the Employer conceeds that the grievant
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was cooperative and exhibited a proper attitude, and where the
seriousness of and degree of negligence or other culpability
for the accidents are arguable, the Employer should have imposed
a suspension as the next disciplinary step.
Also, the evidence indicates that other drivers who had
been involved in accidents were formally "retrained.11

I think,

for there to be a requisite even-handedness, the grievant should
have been accorded a similar benefit.
In reducing the discipline to a suspension the grievant
is expressly warned that a failure to bring his driving or
accident record to a satisfactory level, will justify his
discharge.
pay.

The grievant's reinstatement shall be without back

The period between his discharge and reinstatement shall

be deemed a disciplinary suspension.

He is not entitled to any

back pay for the further reason that he made no effort to find
other employment during the relevant period.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the contract
between the above named parties, and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of said parties makes the following
AWARD:
The discharge of Ramon Regina is reduced to
a disciplinary suspension. He shall be reinstated without back pay. Following reinstatement he shall be required to undergo retraining of a type and for a duration to be
determined by the Employer.

DATED: April 17, 1984
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who execute
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA
-and- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
AWARD
and
OPINION

Local 100, Transport Workers Union
of Greater New York
and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer have just cause to discharge
Ramon Regina? If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on April 10, 1984 at which time Mr.
Regina, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The grievant was discharge from his job as a bus driver
because of a record of accidents.
I find .that the grievant's accident record was excessive
for the period of his employment; that his accident "contacts"
were significantly greater than other drivers similarly situated;
that the last in the series of accidents was serious, causing
considerable damage; that discipline for the accident record,
especially the last accident was warranted; but that the penalty
of discharge was at this point, too severe.
The grievant was involved in a total of fifteen accidents
over a two and one-half year period.

All but the last were
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rainor in nature, with little or no damage.

The Employer

classifies four as "chargeable," four as "preventable" and \n as "non-ch

the "chargeable" category in which the grievant's bus struck a
truck which had stopped ahead, was serious and resulted in over
$13,000 in damage to the bus.
I do not hold that the Employer's right to discipline including ultimate discharge, is limited to "chargeable" and/or
"preventable" accidents.

(I find no need in this case to define

these categories or to judge the accuracy or propriety of the
Employer's definitions).

Rather, I accept the general existence

of a psychological, conscious or unconscious disposition or
state of being "accident-prone."

It appears to me that this

condition may afflict the grievant in addition to his probable
negligence or inattention in connection with a few of the
accidents.

As the Employer provides public transportation

services to the community, it _has a high duty of .care and is
required to take all reasonable and appropriate steps to insure
the safety 'of its vehicles and drivers.

Therefore, "accident

proneness" as well as accident culpability are grounds for
discipline, including ultimate discharge.

However, on the other

hand, a driver is not an "absolute insurer" that

his driving

will be totally accident free, and a single serious accident,
like the grievant's last, even when joined by a series of other
minor accidents is not, under the circumstances of this case,

-3 -

grounds for summary dismissal.
Like any traditional condition of "poor or unsatisfactory
work," a driver with an accident record is entitled to the
disciplinary impact and the potentially rehabilitative effort
and effect of progressive discipline, unless that record or a
particular accident(s) is so obviously and egregiously
negligence or wilfullness as to warrant summary dismissal.

I

am not persuaded that the grievant's record, including the last
accident has yet risen to that latter level.
All but the last accident were minor.
grievant's fault in any respect.

Most were not the

Commendably, the Employer

acknowledged that it tried to rehabilitate the grievant with
counseling and warnings.

That being so, the Company should have

utilized the next traditional step of progressive discipline,
a suspension, before imposing the ultimate penalty of discharge.
It is well known and well settled, that a suspension is
an effective tool of both warning and attempted rehabilitation.
More than a warning alone, it puts the offending employee on
specific and tangible notice by depriving him of working time
and pay, that his record is unsatisfactory, that it will not
be much longer tolerated, and that unless improved to a satisfactory level, will result in discharge.
Under the particular circumstances

of this case, where

the Employer properly warned the grievant in an effort to rehabilitate him; where the Employer conceeds that the grievant
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was cooperative and exhibited

a proper attitude, and where the

seriousness of and degree of negligence or other culpability
for the accidents are arguable, the Employer should have imposed
a suspension as the next disciplinary step.
Also, the evidence indicates that other drivers who had
been involved in accidents were formally "retrained."

I think,

for there to be a requisite even-handedness, the grievant should
have been accorded a similar benefit.
In reducing the discipline to a suspension the grievant
is expressly warned that a failure to bring his driving or
accident record to a satisfactory level, will justify his
discharge.
pay.

The grievant's reinstatement shall be without back

The period between his discharge and reinstatement shall

be deemed a disciplinary suspension.

He is not entitled to any

back pay for the further reason that he made no effort to finJ
other employment during the relevant period.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the contract
between the above named parties, and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of said parties makes the following
AWARD:
The discharge of Ramon Regina is reduced to
a disciplinary suspension. He shall be reinstated without back pay. Following reinstatement he shall be required to undergo retraining of a type and for a duration to be
determined by the Employer.

DATED: April 17, 1984
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )"

Eric J. Sehmertz
Impartial Chairman
'

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who execuuec
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union of America,
Local 100

OPINION and AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The issue involves the grievance of Joseph Fenchak for
vacation pay.
A hearing was held on June 4, 1984 at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
When the Company granted vacation benefits to certain
employees following their return to work after the strike, it
accorded a benefit greater than required by the contract.
Under the contract and consistent practice, to be eligible
for vacation pay, an employee must complete the twelve month
period between his anniversary dates.

No pro rata vacation is

paid an employee who leaves the Company's employ before completing the full twelve month period and before reaching his anniversary date.
Here the Company gave vacation benefits effective as of
the employee's anniversary date though at the time the anniversary dates were reached the affected employees were not working,
but were on strike, (less a pro rata amount for the period of
the strike).

In other words, those employees who would have

been at work on their anniversary dates but for the strike were
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accorded vacation benefits essentially as if the strike had not
occurred and as if they were at work at and during the critical
period.
By creating conditions for vacation benefits that varied
and exceeded what was required under the contract, the Company
had the right to attach a condition.

The condition it attached

was that the employee accorded the benefit had to return to work
following the strike.

The grievant did not meet this condition.

He did not and has not returned to the Company's employ after
the strike and therefore he was not and is not similarly situated
to those employees who did return and who received vacation pay
retroactively effective on their anniversary dates. Accordingly
it cannot be successfully argued that the grievant was either
dealt with discriminatorily or improperly denied a benefit
accorded others similarly situated or to which he was entitled
under the contract.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the
following AWARD:
The grievance of Joseph Fenchak for vacation
pay is denied.

DATED: June 25, 1984
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
.
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I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100, Transport Workers Union
of America

OPINION AND AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issues are:
1) Was there just cause for the discharge
of Wilfred Rodriguez?
2)

The grievance of Joseph Fenchak for
"tool allowance."

A hearing was held on June 26, 1984, at which time Mr.
Rodriguez and representatives of the above named Union and
Employer appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examne and cross-examine
witnesses.
The Discharge of Wilfred Rodriguez
Mr. Rodriguez was discharged for excessive absenteeism.
Prior to his dismissal he was twice formally warned.

The last

warning, identified as a "final warning" replaced a planned
suspension, when the Union on behalf of Rodriguez requested that
the Employer impose a lesser penalty.
The Union does not dispute the excessive nature of
Rodriguez's absenteeism nor the lack of improvement in that
record following the "final warning."

Instead, the Union asserts

that Rodriguez should be excused because the absences were due
primarily to illness.
Rodriguez's health is immaterial.

It is well settled that

excessive absenteeism, for whatever reason and even if beyond
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the employee's fault or control, warrants dismissal, after the
imposition of lesser progressive discipline penalties.

An

employer has the right to insist on reliable and regular attendance by employees and need not retain an employee who cannot meet
that requirement.

This is especially true where, as here, the

Employer provides scheduled transportation services to the public
The Employer has met the requirement of progressive disciplin
Rodriguez was previously warned.

He would have been suspended

also had the Union not requested that that penalty be waived in
favor of a second warning.

I deem the second or final warning

under that circumstance to be the equivalent of a suspension.
When Rodriguez's attendance failed to improve thereafter the
situation was ripe for discharge.
"Tool Allowance" of Fenchak
The "tool allowance" grievance of Joseph Fenchak is limited
to the claim by the Union that the Employer had no right to require Fenchak to return a certain wrench, which the Employer had
issued to Fenchak, when Fenchak left his job following the strike.
The Union asks that the Employer return the wrench to Fenchak or
pay him its value.
I find no need to recite or interpret the contract provisions
dealing with the "tool allowance."

Rather, the instant dispute

can be resolved on the basis of the evidence and testimony of
past practice in similar or relevant situations.
The Employer stated that the practice has been to permit
employees to keep the tools given them by the Employer (or for

-3which the Employer has provided reimbursement) when the employee
quits the job if he "is in good standing and gives notice."

Only

one other former employee was not allowed to keep the tools, and
that was a man who was fired "for stealing."
I hardly think Fenchak fell into the latter category.
did not return to work following the strike.

He

He was not guilty

of any misconduct and indeed though apparently he first indicated
he would return to work after the strike, he later called and
said he would not because he had another job.
Under these particular circumstances I find that Fenchak
was in "good standing" when he left;

that he notified the Employe

when he found another job; and that under the Employer's practice
and standards, he had not disqualified himself from retaining the
wrench.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Impartial Chairman
under the collective bargaining agreement between the above named
parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties, makes the following AWARD:
1)

The discharge of Wilfred Rodriguez was
for just cause.

2)

Joseph Fenchak was entitled to retain
the particular wrench in question. The
Employer shall give him that wrench or
pay him its monetary value.

DATED: July 2, 1984
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
axecuted this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA
-andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 Transport Workers Union
of America

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer violate Section 26 as amended
by the February 27th Memorandum of Agreement
of the collective bargaining agreement when it
unilaterally terminated Blue Cross coverage for
its employees and substituted therefor a selfinsured program? If so, what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were duly held at which time representatives of
the above named Union and Employer appeared. All concerned were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
'examine and cross-examine witnesses.
waived.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

The parties filed post-hearing briefs.

Under the aforementioned contract provision the Employer
has the right to change the carriers or the methods of insuring
the Hospital Coverage, Basic Medical Protection, Dental Protection
Major Medical Insurance, Prescription Drug and Optical Plan provided that the plans utilized insure benefits equivalent to the
Hospitalization and Welfare Benefits in effect on November 30,
1983.

(As enumerated in the contract).
The Employer changed from Blue Cross {which was in effect

as of November 30, 1983) to a self insured hospital program.

The
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issue is whether the self insured plan is "equivalent" to the
prior Blue Cross plan for the same coverage and benefits.
At the hearing I ruled that the Employer had the burden of
proof regarding equivalency.
stantive equivalency.

The Union does not challenge sub-

That is, it does not contend that the

eligibility, entitlements, or payments for the enumerated service
and coverage are not equivalent under the self-insured plan to
what was provided under Blue Cross.

Indeed, it appears from the

record that no claims under the self-insured plan have gone unpaid, and there are no claims that employees (or their families)
were denied the payment or scope of medical services under the
self-insured plan to which they would have been entitled under
Blue Cross.
Rather, the Union's contention is that access to hospitalization (and hospital treatment) under the self-insured plan is
more difficult and more time consuming than under Blue Cross and
in one alleged incident, was denied.
I have decided not to disturb the present status quo of
the self-insured plan, but to reserve my decision and retain
jurisdiction of this issue pending further experience and evidenc
of the application

of the self-insured plan.

I agree with the Union that access to a hospital and hospital
services are relevant to and a factor in equivalency, and that
delays or denials in gaining admission to a hospital under the
self-insured plan which would not take place under Blue Cross,
would create a condition of non-equivalency.

In short, equivalency

-3is not limited to the nature of the actual medical coverage or
to the amount of medical payment but includes the ease or facilit
attendant to gaining admission to the hospital.
I conclude that the evidence in the record thus far is
primarily speculative and opinion.

As the self-insured plan is

relatively new, the paucity of actual experience is not surprising.

It remains to be seen, for example, whether the Employer's

24 hour telephone service for hospital inquiry is an adequate
and equivalent substitute for the well known Blue Cross card.
It may be or it may not be, depending on incidents and experience
yet to take place.
In view of the Employer's cituation of the legal duties of
hospitals throughout the United States to admit patients; and
the wording on its self-insured medical card facilitating a
hospital call to the Employer at any hour to check coverage and
eligibility; and in view of the fact that there are no unpaid or
denied claims outstanding, I am not prepared to conclude that the
Employer has not met its burden of showing equivalency.

The

Union's testimony of an employee who allegedly had trouble gaining hospital treatment for a child, and the opinions of an employee of Blue Cross are probative, but not sufficient to conclusively show non-equivalency.

The latter, as indicated, is the

opinion of one with a possible partisan interest, and the former
was unclear and indeterminative on the facts.
However, my present views on what the record before me
shows regarding the Employer's burden to establish equivalency,

-4is not conclusive.

It is based on the weight and balance of the

evidence thus far, at the early stages of the new plan.
Accordingly, based on the present sparse record, I
shall deny the Union's grievance without prejudice to its right
to renew its complaint upon further evidence or experience purporting to show non-equivalency.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: November 5, 1984
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) " "
'

q q

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA
-andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 Transport Workers Union
of America

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer have just cause to discharge
Ramon Regina? If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on October 24, 1984 at which time Mr.
Regina, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The Employer has now established the grievant's "accident
proneness" within the meaning of my Award of April 17, 1984.
Considering the Employer's special duty of care to the
public, and its application of "progressive discipline" to the
grievant (effectuated as a result of the suspension imposed by
my Award of April 17th), it need not await a serious chargeable
accident by the grievant before removing him from his job as a
bus operator.
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Nor need it any longer run that risk by continuing the
grievant's employment in that capacity.
As the grievant has no rights, under the circumstances,
to any other position, his discharge was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: November 5, 1984
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York ) "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TWU and NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 Transport Workers Union
of America

OPINION

and

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Articles 23 and 38 of
the contract when it prorated employee vacations?
Hearings were duly held and the above named parties were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
For the affected employees the Union seeks full vacation
pay.

To support its position, the Union claims vacation benefit

credits for the period of the recent strike.

The Union's case

is primarily based on assertions of past practice, namely other,
earlier examples of strikes, layoffs, leaves of absence and
absences due to illness during which employees continued to accrue
vacation credits and where those employees received full vacation
pay for the year involved.
The Company disputes the alleged past practice regarding
other strikes, and argues that illnesses, leaves of absence and
layoffs are materially different from a strike, particularly where
as here, the employees seeking the vacation credit for the strike
period were the very employees engaged in the strike.

The Company
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asserts that it is axiomatic that employees do not get vacation
credits, as if they had worked for the period of their strike
unless there is an explicit contract understanding or other agreement according that unusual right, and that there is no such
agreement in this case.
I need not resolve the disputed testimony regarding prior
strikes, nor am I required to consider the similarity of or
differences between strikes and other interruptions of active
employment.

The fact is, as I see it, that this issue is deter-

mined by the Strike Settlement Agreement.
That Agreement expressly provides that the contract and the
terms and conditions of employment shall "commenc(e) with the
date on which the employees return to work and bus service is
resumed..."
It goes on to specify that the terms and conditions of the
•

contract ... dated August 5, 1981 shall be continued except as
modified by this memorandum ..."
I conclude that the foregoing provisions mean that the expired contract of August 5, 1981, as modified by and together
with the new terms and conditions agreed to, merged into a new
contract beginning with the return to work.
I am persuaded therefore that the parties agreed upon a
settlement of the strike which "continued" and began the contract
terms when the strike ended and did not make the terms and conditions of the new contract retroactive to include the period of
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of the strike.
To grant the Union's grievance in this case would be to
give retroactive vacation benefit credits for the period of the
strike.

(The Company's vacation pay in this case was prorated

because it excluded from that payment any credit for the strike
period.)
The result that the Union seeks is expressly contrary to
the terms of the Strike Settlement, and I find no other explicit
or unambiguous contract language which would permit a different
conclusion.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The Company did not violate Articles 23 and
38 of the contract when it prorated employee
vacations.

DATED: December 17, 1984
STATE OF New York )s s
COUNTY OF New York ) ' ''

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Professional Staff Association

OPINION and AWARD
Case #1930 0026 84

and
New York State United Teachers
The stipulated issue is:
Did New York State United Teachers (NYSUT)
violate Articles 1C and XIA of the PSANYSUT agreement by its November 2, 1983
memorandum regarding "dress"? If so, what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on July 23, 1984 at which time representatives of the above named Association (PSA) and NYSUT appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

The parties filed post-hearing

briefs.
The November 2, 1983 memorandum regarding "dress" reads:
The officers and the Executive Board take pride
in the fact that we have an exemplary and competent staff. This competence and expertise is not
always evident to the public or our constituency.
NYSUT is at the forefront of an effort to seek
excellence and equality in public education and
to promote a positive image in and of the union
movement.
Our mission requires that, at all times, we conduct ourselves in a courteous and professional
manner. This pertains to personal behavior as
well as appearance. Our appearance has an impact. We should not inadvertently embarrass or
offend our membership nor project negative impressions. We should and would like to project a positive professional image. We believe this to be in
the best interests of our membership.

-2There have been an increasing number of comments
relating to the appearance of our employees,
enough to be of concern. We believe that the
image we portray is an important and legitimate
concern. We want to project to the public and
to our constituents a well attired, clean, neat
and appealing type of individual.
Dress that meets the standard of current business
practice of all men and women should be worn to
the office and in the public forums where we represent our members and the organization.
We desire your cooperation in being sensitive about the image we project to the public and to our
membership.
Article 1C of the contract reads:
NYSUT agrees that it will fully comply with the
law with respect to the personal and organizational rights of its employees. It is further agreed
that this Agreement shall be applied by both parties
without regard to race, creed, color, religion,
natural origin, age, or sex.
Article XIA of the contract reads:
FULL COMMITMENT OF PARTIES
This Agreement shall constitute the full and complete commitments between both parties and may be
altered, changed, added to, deleted from, or modified only through the voluntary, mutual consent
of the parties in a written and signed amendment
to this Agreement.
The Association claims that a "dress code" is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining and must be bilaterally agreed
to presumably under Article XI A of the contract.

It argues that

as the "full and complete commitments" of the Agreement as referred
to in Article XI A do not contain references to required dress of
employees, NYSUT had no contractual right to unilaterally promulgate or implement the November 2, 1983 memorandum.
Also the Association contends that the memorandum is ambiguous;
has been unreasonably implemented; and interferes with the long
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standing practice of the exercise of individual discretion in
dress by the staff.
NYSUT asserts that its memorandum is an exercise of its
managerial authority to issue work rules; that the memorandum
and particularly the instructions of the fifth paragraph thereof
are reasonable and related to the nature of the work involved;
and that NYSUT has a clear interest in having its staff dressing
in proper attire in the office, in the field and in public forums
and settings.
I am satisfied that the majority view on the matter of
"dress codes" is that it falls within the managerial right to
promulgate and enforce reasonable work rules.

The majority view

is that it is not a condition of employment requiring mandatorily
bilateral negotiations and agreement.
I am in agreement with what I consider to be this majority
view.

That being so, I do not find that NYSUT was prohibited per

se from promulgation of a rule regarding "dress" by the provision
of Article 1C.

Nor can I find that the November 2, 1983 memoran-

dum and the "dress code" set forth therein failed to comply with
the"law with respect to the personal or organizational rights of
...employees," or that its application was discriminatory as to
"race, creed, color, religion, natural (sic) origin, age or sex."
Rather, I conclude that NYSUT had the bare right to promulgate the memorandum and the rule therein under its reserved
managerial authority.

The well settled restrictions on that

right are that the rule must be clear, reasonable, related to a
legitimate need, relevant to the employment setting, adequately

-4publicized and consistently and evenhandedly implemented and
enforced.
I agree with the Association that its instant grievance is
not limited to the bare promulgation of the dress requirements
of the November 2, 1983 memorandum.

If it was so limited I

would find no fault with the memorandum reserving the rights of
the parties to later challenge and defend the particular case by
case implementation of the dress standards.
goes further.

But the grievance

It protests certain examples of implementation,

taking issue for example over the apparent standardization of
dress both in the office, where there are no dealings with the
public, officials or members, and in other more formal and/or
official settings.

Again by example, the Association claims that

to require jackets and possibly ties in the informal setting of
the office is unnecessary and unreasonable, and challenges actual
instances when staff members were required to so comply.
Clearly, any dress code of this type must be applied with a
"rule of reason."

In some informal settings (but not so inform-

al as a recreational setting) sport shirts without ties or jacket
may be quite proper.

Other situations, such as meetings with

school officials, govermental agents or even with member locals,
more formal attire may be properly required.

The same rule of

reason would apply to footwear and outer garments.

(For example,

I am inclined to agree that sneakers, running shoes or sandals
would not be proper in any setting other than recreational, but
the instant "dress code" does not expressly deal with that
circumstance.)

-5In this particular employment arrangement, I am persuaded
that there are a variety of settings which could dictate different appropriate dress.

Among those settings are: (1) in the

office, but without dealings with the public, officials or the
membership; (2) formal meetings, arbitrations,

PERB proceedings

and negotiations; (3) meetings with local unions and their member
ship; and (4) recreational or social activities which are part
of the job.
NYSUT's memorandum requires a standard of dress consistent
with "current business practice" for "the office and in public
forums..."

While I do not find that to be unreasonable or devoid

of necessity, I do not find it to be sufficiently clear as to be
unambiguous or adequately instructional or directional for
compliance without raising disagreements over interpretation in
one or more of the above four settings (or in any other employment setting I may have overlooked).

In short, I do not think

that the rule or the memorandum makes sufficiently clear what
"current business practices" are, and while I may have my own
views on what that means, I do not think that such clarification
or delineation should be legislated by the arbitrator, particularly when, as here, the Employer is capable of spelling out the
details.
I do not think it too burdensome or irregular to require
NYSUT to be more specific in its dress requirements, and to reissue the rule with more specificity and more explicit examples
of how it expects the staff to dress (or not dress) in the principal employment settings.

This may require some thought and
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details, but a "dress code" is not so complicated or unusual to
make the task difficult.
Accordingly, while upholding NYSUT's managerial right to
promulgate and implement a rule on "dress" and while I find the
rule set forth in the November 2, 1983 memorandum to be reasonable and legitimately related to the work involved, I do not
find it to be sufficiently clear or unambiguous

to facilitate

compliance without further disagreement and dispute.

Therefore

I find the instant rule too vague for enforcement and direct
NYSUT, before it can enforce the rule, to re-issue it in a form
that better and more specifically delineates what is required
of staff.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
NYSUT's memorandum of November 2, 1983 and
the dress rule therein was a proper exercise
of its managerial rule making authority. However the terms of the rule on dress are too
vague and ambiguous to be adequately understood
and complied with. It is presently unenforceable
on those grounds. But NYSUT has the right to
re-issue the rule with specific instructions
related to the different employment settings
in which the staff works. The rights of the
parties are reserved on the substance of any
re-issued rule and/or its case by case implementation thereafter.

DATE: December 3, 1984
STATE OF New York )
.
COUNTY OF New York )ss''

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
/ f
between
<-_-•-

Communication Workers of America
RULING
and

New York Telephone Company

The threshold question requiring a ruling is whether
this case is confined to the grievance of J. Manley, or
whether the grievances of R. Barbarelli, D. Burney, R.
Valenzuela and J. Salimbene should be joined with the Manley
grievance and heard in this proceeding by this Arbitrator.
The rule which I think is applicable in this situation
was enumerated years ago by the late David Cole, one of the
most respected arbitrators in the history of the profession.
II

He ruled that absent an explicit contract provision limiting
an arbitration case to a single grievance or explicitly
barring multiple grievances in the same case, joinder of
grievances is contractually proper and a motion for joinder
should be granted.
I agree with this rule, especially where as here, there
is no such express and limiting contract language and the
grievances appear to be related to the same or similar circumstances.

Additionally the contract permits either side to

submit terminal grievances to the arbitration forum, again
without limiting any arbitration to only one such grievance.
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Accordingly the Company's motion to join the five grievances
in this case is granted.

I assure the Union that in this

case each grievant will be given his "day in court;" that
each will be accorded due process; and that the burden is on
the Company to prove that as to each grievant its discipline
was for just cause.

:tc~J^ Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 14, 1983

In the Matter of the Arbitration
! between
Communication Workers of America
RULING
and

New York Telephone Company

The threshold question requiring a ruling is whether
this case is confined to the grievance of J. Manley, or
whether the grievances of R. Barbarelli, D. Burney, R.
Valenzuela and J. Salimbene should be joined with the Manley
grievance and heard in this proceeding by this Arbitrator.
The rule which I think is applicable in this situation
was enumerated years ago by the late David Cole, one of the
most respected arbitrators in the history of the profession.
He ruled that absent an explicit contract provision limiting
an arbitration case to a single grievance or explicitly
barring multiple grievances in the same case, joinder of
grievances is contractually proper and a. motion for joinder
should be granted.
I agree with this rule, especially where as here, there
is no such express and limiting contract language and the
grievances appear to be related to the same or similar circumstances.

Additionally the contract permits either side to

submit terminal grievances to the arbitration forum, again
without limiting any arbitration to only one such grievance.
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Accordingly the Company's motion to join the five grievances
in this case is granted.

I assure the Union that in this

case each grievant will be given his "day in court;" that
each will be accorded due process; and that the burden is on
the Company to prove that as to each grievant its discipline
was for just cause.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 14, 1983

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communication Workers of America
OPINION
and
AWARD

and
New York Telephone

Company

l

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the suspensions of M. Glennon and
R. Thomson were for just cause?
A hearing was held on May 18, 1984 at which time Messrs.
Glennon and Thomson, hereinafter referred to as the "grievants"
Ij
!i
I I and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.

i!

! All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
I
I argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The grievants were suspended two days and seven hours each
for "poor work performance."

They also received accompanying

warnings.
The Company claims that the grievants were expressly instructed by their foreman to pressure test all the cables in a
II

particular manhole; make repairs of all leaks; and "black strap"
all the cables;

that the grievants failed to perform the work as

instructed; and that as a consequence a cable failure occurred the
next day interrupting customer service.
I accept the Company's testimony that the grievants were
given the specific responsibility to test the cables and repair
the leaks.

That another cable splicer (Mr. O'Shea) may have tested

the cable that subsequently failed is immaterial on two grounds.

-2First, work by O'Shea on cable testing exclusively and expressly
assigned to the grievants by the foreman was thus unauthorized,
and the burden or responsibility for doing that work cannot thereI by be shifted from the grievants to O'Shea, nor can the propriety |
of its performance by 0'Shea be imputed to the foreman or to the
Company.

In short any re-arrangement of the work assignments by

the cable splicers themselves was done at the grievants peril, if,
i as here, the work they were to perform turned out to be faulty or
| not done.

It follows then that in view of these specific work

1
j

| instructions and assignments, a rule, if it exists, that the last I
man out of the manhole is responsible for the condition of the
hole is inapplicable here.
Secondly, and significantly, there is no probative evidence
in the record that O'Shea was the one who tested the cable that
! later failed.

None of the witnesses who were called could testify!
|
; to that fact, and 0'Shea was not present at the hearing and did not

(testify.

Instead the unrefuted testimony by the Company, and

admitted by one of the grievants, is that both grievants conceded

I
to the Company that they had not tested the cable that failed.

I
That concession together with an absence of any evidence that
O'Shea tested that cable leaves the record fatally prejudicial to
the grievants.

They admit or do not dispute that they did not

test that cable and yet are unable to show that O'Shea did the
testing. Indeed, the further unrefuted testimony of the foreman
jis that he specifically assigned O'Shea totally different work,
namely truck driving and delivery and removal of supplies and
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!

equipment.
Under that circumstance there is no evidence to impute to
the foreman any knowledge that O'Shea did the testing, even if
the foreman saw him in the manhole.

Instead the logical and

reasonable conclusion is not only that the grievants did not do
what they were told to do but had no reason to believe or rely
on a belief that O'Shea did the work.
For disciplinary purposes, where the standards of proof
are less than in criminal cases, I do not find it illogical or
unreasonable for the Company to conclude that the cable break
the next day was the proximate result of the grievants' failure
to test it for leaks.

Under that circumstance a disciplinary

penalty is warranted.

I do not find the issuance of warnings and

| suspensions of two days and seven hours to be improper.

i

The prior arbitration cases cited by the Union are factually]
distinguished from the instant case and therefore I do not believei
j the instant decision is contrary or inconsistent.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and

jj having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
[I parties, makes the following AWARD:
The warnings and suspensions of M. Glennon
•and R. Thomson were for just cause.

DATED: May 21, 1984
i STATE OF New York )
.
1 COUNTY OF New York)"* '

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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Whether the suspensions of M. Glennon and
R. Thomson were for just cause?
A hearing was held on May 18, 1984 at which time Messrs.
Glennon and Thomson, hereinafter referred to as the "grievants"
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitra-

tor's Oath was waived.
The grievants were suspended two days and seven hours each
for "poor work performance."

They also received accompanying

warnings.
The Company claims that the grievants were expressly instructed by their foreman to pressure test all the cables in a
particular manhole; make repairs of all leaks; and "black strap"
all the cables;

that the grievants failed to perform the work as

instructed; and that as a consequence a cable failure occurred the
next day interrupting customer service.
I accept the Company's testimony that the grievants were
given the specific responsibility to test the cables and repair
the leaks.

That another cable splicer (Mr. O'Shea) may have tested

the cable that subsequently failed is immaterial on two grounds.
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First, work by O'Shea on cable testing exclusively and expressly
assigned to the grievants by the foreman was thus unauthorized,
and the burden or responsibility for doing that work cannot thereby be shifted from the grievants to O'Shea, nor can the propriety
of its performance by O'Shea be imputed to the foreman or to the
Company.

In short any re-arrangement of the work assignments by

the cable splicers themselves was done at the grievants peril, if,
as here, the work they were to perform turned out to be faulty or
not done.

It follows then that in view of these specific work

instructions and assignments, a rule, if it exists, that the last
man out of the manhole is responsible for the condition of the
hole is inapplicable here.
Secondly, and significantly, there is no probative evidence
in the record that O'Shea was the one who tested the cable that
later failed.

None of the witnesses who were called could testify

to that fact, and 0'Shea was not present at the hearing and did no
testify.

Instead the unrefuted testimony by the Company, and

admitted by one of the grievants, is that both grievants conceded
to the Company that they had not tested the cable that failed.
That concession together with an absence of any evidence that
O'Shea tested that cable leaves the record fatally prejudicial to
the grievants.

They admit or do not dispute that they did not

test that cable and yet are unable to show that O'Shea did the
testing. Indeed, the further unrefuted testimony of the foreman
is that he specifically assigned O'Shea totally different work,
namely truck driving and delivery and removal of supplies and
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equipment.
Under that circumstance there is no evidence to impute to
the foreman any knowledge that O'Shea did the testing, even if
the foreman saw him in the manhole.

Instead the logical and

reasonable conclusion is not only that the grievants did not do
what they were told to do but had no reason to believe or rely
on a belief that O'Shea did the work.
For disciplinary purposes, where the standards of proof
are less than in criminal cases, I do not find it illogical or
unreasonable for the Company to conclude that the cable break
the next day was the proximate result of the grievants' failure
to test it for leaks.

Under that circumstance a disciplinary

penalty is warranted.

I do not find the issuance of warnings and

suspensions of two days and seven hours to be improper.
The prior arbitration cases cited by the Union are factually
distinguished from the instant case and therefore I do not believe
the instant decision is contrary or inconsistent.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The warnings and suspensions of M. Glennon
and R. Thomson were for just cause.

DATED: May 21, 1984
STATE OF New York )
.
COUNTY OF New Y o r k ) * '

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

